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The Supreme Court has no official role in designing or establishing national 
policy;1 that is considered the domain of Congress.2  However, congressional 
expression of policy can be incomplete or inartful, and this can provide the 
opportunity for extravagant interpretations of the nation’s laws.  One example 
of this is the law of labor arbitration, which the Supreme Court has been crafting 
since 1957.3  More recently, the Court has embarked on a revolutionary 
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 1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”).  See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (“[W]e 
possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments.  Those decisions are 
entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree 
with them.  It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.”).  
But see Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 399 n.27 (1991) (“This Court has recently recognized 
that judges do engage in policymaking at some level.”). 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).  
See also supra note 1 and accompanying text (distinguishing the role of Congress and the courts 
with regard to policymaking). 
 3. For example, the Court relied on a narrow provision in the Labor Management Relations 
Act (LMRA) that gave federal courts jurisdiction to enforce labor contracts in order to conclude 
that federal courts can make substantive labor laws.  See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln 
Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 45657 (1957).  The LMRA provides: 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or 
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arbitration program for the nation using the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) as its 
authority.4  The core provision of the FAA states that arbitration agreements are 
just as enforceable as any other contract.5 
Relying primarily on this rule of enforceability, the Court has restructured 
what arbitration is, what arbitration does, and who benefits from arbitration 
agreements.6  Although arbitration is generally understood as an economical, 
speedy, fair, and informal alternative to court adjudication,7 FAA precedents 
                                                 
between such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United 
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or 
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012).  Although the 
statute provides no substantive law to govern such suits, the Court interpreted Section 301 of the 
LMRA as instructing federal courts to make such laws.  See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 45657.  
This ruling set the foundation for a large body of Court-created laws that severely limited judicial 
resolution of labor disputes and promoted disposition via the arbitral forum.  See Stephen A. Plass, 
Using Pyett to Counter the Fall of Contract-based Unionism in a Global Economy, 34 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 219, 22021 (2013) (discussing the seminal rules of deference to the arbitral 
forum as formulated by the Court starting in 1960).  These new rules of deference to the arbitral 
forum were a dramatic change in national policy, as only two years earlier, in Association of 
Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Court ruled that Congress 
had created no substantive federal right in Section 301.  See 348 U.S. 437, 45253 (1955), overruled 
in part by Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).  Coincidentally, this interpretation 
was rationalized by the need to avoid court congestion.  Id. at 460.  The Court noted that Congress 
did not intend Section 301 to be a vehicle to flood federal courts with grievances for breach of labor 
contracts.  Id.  The Court later circumvented the problem of flooding the courts with labor contract 
grievances with Court-created rules of deference to the arbitral forum.  See Plass, supra, at 22021. 
 4. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 116 (2012). 
 5. See id. § 2.  See also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983). 
 6. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 7. These attributes of arbitration have remained intact throughout history, serving as the 
driving force for a national arbitration policy in 1925.  See KATHERINE V.W. STONE ET AL., 
ARBITRATION LAW 2936 (discussing the benefits of arbitration in the context of the historical 
foundations of modern U.S. arbitration law) (3d ed. 2015).  The traditionally-accepted benefits of 
arbitration continue to serve as a marketing tool for arbitration service providers.  The websites of 
the American Arbitration Association (AAA), Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), 
and the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), all declare that arbitration is a fast, fair, and economical 
alternative to court litigation.  See About the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www. 
adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about?_afrLoop=222264190865295&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=4
3k4w8p2q_1#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3D43k4w8p2q_1%26_afrLoop%3D222264190865295%
26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D43k4w8p2q_55 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) 
(“[T]he AAA aims to move cases through arbitration or mediation in a fair and impartial manner 
until completion.”); Why JAMS?, JUD. ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVS., http://www. 
jamsadr.com/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) (“JAMS mediators and arbitrators successfully resolve 
cases ranging in size, industry and complexity, typically achieving results more efficiently and cost 
effectively than through litigation.”); Employment Arbitration and Mediation, NAT’L 
ARBITRATION FORUM,  http://www.adrforum.com/Employment (last visited Sept. 28, 2015) 
(“When it comes to the arbitration of employment disputes, the FORUM Code of Procedure provides 
an efficient framework through which to resolve employment disputes, and sufficient due-process 
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have endorsed expensive, lengthy, and unfair arbitration practices.8  By 
selectively prioritizing the goals of the FAA on a case-by-case basis, the Court 
has made arbitration the vehicle of choice for those who bargain from a position 
of power.9  For most American workers and consumers, arbitration is now an 
adjudicative alternative they must accept, even when the process is structured to 
ensure that they cannot effectively vindicate their legal rights.10 
This Article offers a new perspective on how a law created to help merchants 
avoid the costs, delays, and inexpert judgments of courts became a national 
policy of enforcement that harms consumers and workers who do not wish to 
arbitrate.  First, it recounts the Court’s jurisprudence on the scope, preemptive, 
and substantive powers of the FAA.11  This Article then complements existing 
scholarship by demonstrating that it is historically implausible to reach the 
Court’s interpretive conclusions about the FAA. 
                                                 
protections to ensure that Employees have ample opportunity to assert all of their contractual and 
statutory rights.”). 
 8. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) 
(upholding an arbitration agreement that imposed the high costs of prosecuting an antitrust claim 
on each individual claimant seeking a modest recovery); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 1753 (2011) (upholding a class action ban in a consumer contract although the 
practical effect was to insulate the business from legitimate claims because each consumer would 
have to adjudicate a claim for $30.22).  Class bans are enforced, although they provide an unfair 
advantage to businesses and saddle workers and consumers with high costs and generate duplicative 
litigation.  See id.  See also Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in 
the Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 14 (2014) (describing the Court’s holding in 
American Express as a “sweeping embrace of forced arbitration”). 
 9. Instead of considering all of the virtues of arbitration to be equally important, the Court 
has created its own ranking system, and appears to deploy individual virtues of arbitration to justify 
particular results on a case-by-case basis.  For example, on some occasions, consent or the parties’ 
contractual freedom is preeminent, while in others, efficiency is controlling.  See, e.g., Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (holding that Congress’s primary desire in passing 
the FAA was to enforce the parties’ agreement to arbitrate); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (holding 
that the principal advantage of arbitration is its informality).  In contrast, fairness of the arbitral 
forum is not necessarily considered an FAA interest.  See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 231112 
(holding that the FAA does not seek to ensure that low-value claims can be prosecuted). 
 10. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2308, 2312.  See also Adam Raviv, Too Darn Bad: How 
the Supreme Court’s Class Arbitration Jurisprudence Has Undermined Arbitration, 6 Y.B. ON 
ARB. & MEDIATION 220, 22527 (2014) (discussing the ramifications of Concepcion for arbitration 
agreements and those who participate in them). 
 11. The FAA does not contain an express preemption provision, and Congress did not evince 
an intention in the FAA to occupy the entire field of arbitration.  See generally Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 116 (2012).  See also Norman T. Braslow, Contractual Stipulation for Judicial 
Review and Discovery in United States-Japan Arbitration Contracts, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 659, 
704 (2004) (noting that “there is no express preemption clause in the Federal Arbitration Act”); 
David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme 
Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 5, 2326 
(discussing the absence of Congress’s preemptive intent when passing the FAA).  However, the 
Court has ruled that state laws that are obstacles to the objectives of the FAA are preempted.  See 
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
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In 1925, the consumer, labor, and employment laws that the FAA now 
preempts did not exist, and therefore played no role in shaping the FAA’s text 
or national arbitration policy.12  In cases where a conflict exists between two 
federal laws, the later-enacted statute normally takes precedence.13  Yet the 
Court has rejected federal and state regulations, passed after the FAA’s 
enactment, that seek to protect workers and consumers by guaranteeing judicial 
resolution of certain types of disputes.14  This analysis complements textual and 
legislative evidence that indicates that the Court is reading the FAA too broadly. 
Part II of this Article evaluates the Court’s enforceability rules for the FAA, 
and demonstrates that the Court created new national principles that depart from 
those set by Congress when it passed the FAA.  It posits that Congress, in passing 
the FAA, acted on the premise that both parties voluntarily consented to 
arbitration for its speed, lower costs, and expert neutrals,15 that parties regularly 
agreed to arbitrate both before and after disputes arose,16 and that substantive 
rights were not regulated in arbitration contracts.17 
However, the Court has upended the FAA by ignoring the fact that voluntary 
consent is no longer the touchstone of arbitration agreements, as well as the 
reality that the more powerful contracting party often exclusively controls the 
rules for the arbitration forum.18  The Court has also nullified the FAA’s 
provision for post-dispute arbitration through a severability myth that pre-
dispute arbitration contracts can exist independent of the underlying 
                                                 
 12. See Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach 
Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 399 (2012). 
 13. See Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (holding that when two federal 
statutes collide, inconsistent provisions in the earlier enacted law are impliedly repealed). See also 
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976). 
 14. See generally CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 671, 673 (2012) (holding 
that a federal law that expressly granted the right to sue, and prohibited waiver of that right, does 
not prevent enforcement of an arbitration agreement).  See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1, 1517 (1984) (holding that a state franchise law that required judicial resolution of disputes 
is preempted as contrary to the parties’ contract and the FAA); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 
49091 (1987) (holding that a state labor law providing for court resolution of wage claims is 
preempted by the FAA); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 36162 (5th Cir. 2013) (relying 
on the FAA precedents to reject the National Labor Relations Board’s decision that employers 
cannot prohibit collective claims of workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act). 
 15. See STONE ET AL., supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 16. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (expressly providing for enforcement of “an agreement in writing 
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy”). 
 17. See generally ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 1-1112 (7th ed. 2012) 
 18. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (explaining how 
previous Court rulings have recognized that arbitrating a statutory claim does not result in a loss of 
substantive rights); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 63637 (1985) (holding 
that when parties agree to arbitrate certain claims, those claims should be judged based on the 
national law governing them). 
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transaction.19  These enforcement rules have effectively transferred to businesses 
control of court access as well as some of the state and federal rights of workers 
and consumers.20 
Part III evaluates the options that are available to reverse the new arbitration 
rules that allow a handful of powerful parties to control employees’ and 
consumers’ access to courts, and choose the rules of arbitration.  It discusses a 
strategy of defiance by lower court judges, partisan attempts at legislative 
override, and the prospect of a Court reversal, based on interpretive 
disagreement of the Justices.21  This section demonstrates that the Supremacy 
Clause, principles of stare decisis, and partisan politics are effective barriers to 
the reversal of the Court’s arbitration decisions.22  Part III concludes with a 
proposal for a simple and narrow legislative fix that has not been considered 
before.  It proposes adding a definition of “arbitration” to the FAA, in order to 
codify the forum attributes of speed, lower costs, fairness, and informality, while 
voiding practices that interfere with these fundamental arbitration attributes and 
goals. 
I.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FAA 
At the turn of the twentieth century, courts were reluctant to allow private 
parties to settle their disputes outside of the judicial system.23  Agreements to 
resolve controversies by private arbitration were frowned upon, and were 
impeded by the common law rule that contracts ousting the court’s jurisdiction 
were unenforceable.24  But the drive of commercial parties to avoid the costs and 
delays of litigation, and the involvement of inexpert judges, gradually garnered 
legislative support for the enforcement of private arbitration agreements.25  In 
1925, the FAA codified a national policy for enforcing such agreements.26  In 
enacting the FAA, Congress decided that arbitration complemented the courts, 
                                                 
 19. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010) (holding that “the 
underlying contract is itself an arbitration agreement.  But that makes no difference.  Application 
of the severability rules does not depend on the substance of the remainder of the contract.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 20. See generally id. at 277879.  Powerful contracting parties are not only free to decide 
whether the weak party litigates, but also they control all of the issues that an arbitrator can decide 
by prescribing this in their arbitration policies.  Id. 
 21. See infra Part III.AC. 
 22. See infra notes 307, 318, 334 and accompanying text. 
 23. See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 2627 (noting that before 1920, courts used a 
revocability doctrine to deny specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, premised on the view 
that private parties cannot oust a court’s jurisdiction and on reservations that the arbitral process 
may not be fair). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See generally id. at 2933 (noting that businessmen pushed for the rejection of the 
revocability doctrine because they desired expert neutrals familiar with industry practices, over the 
costs, delays, and uncertainties of courts that were increasingly inundated with statutory claims). 
 26. See id. at 3334.  See also Wasserman, supra note 12, at 39495. 
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and enacted a narrow law that made agreements to arbitrate just as valid as other 
contracts.27 
However, since then the Supreme Court has converted the FAA into a super-
statute.  In a wide array of decisions, the Court has held that the FAA’s statement 
that arbitration agreements are equally as enforceable as any other contractual 
arrangement trumps any law that interferes with the FAA’s text, policy, or 
goals.28  In practice, this has meant that businesses can require workers and 
consumers to waive their public court forum rights and procedures as a condition 
of securing employment or purchasing goods and services.29  This power to take 
away the judicial forum includes the right to design the processes of the 
arbitration forum in a way that makes the pursuit of legal claims unattractive or 
impractical.30  Furthermore, this power includes the prerogative to reserve the 
judicial forum for claims against workers and consumers.31 
Many in the private and public sectors have found the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence objectionable.32  Some of the harshest and most eloquent 
                                                 
 27. See Wasserman, supra note 12, at 39596. 
 28. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 40405 (1967) 
(holding that the FAA made arbitration contracts enforceable as all other contracts); Volt Info. 
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (holding that 
the FAA’s primary purpose is to promote freedom of contract, and it preempts any law that stands 
as an obstacle to this goal).  See also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 
1753 (2011) (rejecting state precedent that classified arbitration agreements that prohibited class 
claims for small sums in consumer contracts of adhesion that immunized the wrongdoing of 
powerful parties as unconscionable). 
 29. The Court’s broad rule of enforcement is grounded in the premise that no substantive right 
is lost in the arbitral forum.  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (holding that arbitration agreements are enforceable so long as they permit 
the vindication of federal rights).  See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 
26 (1991) (holding that workers still retain their substantive employment protections when they 
agree to arbitrate); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 49091 (1987) (precluding an employee from 
litigating his wage claim under a California law that granted him that right irrespective of the 
existence of an arbitration agreement); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (holding that consumers 
cannot prosecute a class claim for fraud in court because their arbitration agreement, although 
unconscionable under state law, barred class actions); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 
S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (enforcing an arbitration agreement that barred class actions even though 
its structure made it practically impossible for merchants to prosecute their antitrust claims). 
 30. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (holding that a class action ban on arbitration that made 
it financially impractical to pursue legal claims is still enforceable because it did not eliminate the 
right to pursue such claims). 
 31. See supra note 8 (discussing how the Court has ruled that businesses have the ability to 
design arbitration agreements that preclude certain avenues of litigation for workers, while such 
agreements place no limits on businesses’ ability to litigate claims against workers and consumers 
in a judicial forum). 
 32. See Brief of the AFL-CIO and Change to Win as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 24, 1115, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (No. 07-581), 2008 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 621, at *56, 1823 (arguing that FAA forum waiver prerogatives should not be 
extended to unions); Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109, 12122 (2001) (noting 
the objections of twenty-one state attorneys general to the broad coverage the Court granted to the 
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criticisms have come from fellow Supreme Court Justices,33 and some lower 
court judges have done the unthinkable by refusing to apply the Court’s rules.34 
This broad coalition of opponents is driven by the reality that the FAA has 
become a tool that powerful bargainers use to shield themselves from claims.35  
The Court’s conclusion that effective prosecution of legal rights is not an FAA 
interest, and in fact is an interest subordinate to the FAA, places the 
enforceability of a broad spectrum of federal and state rights in doubt.36  
Although the practical effect of the Court’s FAA rules has been a loss of 
substantive rights for many employees and consumers, the Court has not 
relented.37  In fact, the Court has made the FAA’s preemptive powers and 
                                                 
FAA); Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 72, slip op. at *78, 17, 21 (2014) (distinguishing 
the Court’s class action waiver jurisprudence in order to find that such waivers in mandatory 
arbitration contracts violate the NLRA), aff’g D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184 (2012); Brown 
ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 279 (W. Va. 2011), vacated by Marmet 
Health Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (stating that the court’s severability doctrine, 
which permits an arbitration agreement to survive even when the underlying contract is defective, 
was “created from whole cloth”). 
 33. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (noting that “over the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining 
congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an 
edifice of its own creation”); Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 13233 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
that the Court “stand[s] on its own shoulders” to justify its FAA interpretation, thereby advancing 
its policy preferences while ignoring the interests of weak workers); Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2786 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s severability 
doctrine is “something akin to Russian nesting dolls” because it allows courts to pluck from an 
invalid arbitration agreement other valid provisions empowering the arbitrator to decide all 
disputes). 
 34. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 933, 93839 (Mont. 1994), rev’d sub nom. 
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1995) (holding that a Montana law that required 
contracts with arbitration requirements to have conspicuous notice of arbitration on the first page 
was not preempted by the FAA).  See also Brown, 724 S.E.2d at 263 (holding that the FAA did not 
apply to a West Virginia nursing home law that made all predispute arbitration agreements for 
personal injury claims unenforceable). 
 35. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 396 n.121 (2005) (observing that since the 1990s, 
arbitration has become a corporate mechanism to avoid liability). 
 36. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that the FAA 
does not evince a congressional intent to prevent states from regulating areas they traditionally 
occupied).  See also Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 941.  In Casarotto, the court stated: 
[I]f the Federal Arbitration Act is to be interpreted as broadly as some of the decisions 
from our federal courts would suggest, then it presents a serious issue regarding 
separation of powers.  What these interpretations do, in effect, is permit a few major 
corporations to draft contracts regarding their relationship with others that immunizes 
them from accountability under the laws of the states where they do business, and by the 
courts in those states. 
Id. 
 37. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that the Court’s FAA jurisprudence undermines federal statutory rights and 
converts arbitration into a device “to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and 
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substantive rules so expansive that fellow judges have called the Court’s FAA 
work “fantastic” and “revisionist,” among other things.38 
No one has been able to persuade the Court to curb its expansive view of the 
FAA, even after pointing to the theoretical weaknesses or practical harms caused 
by this jurisprudence.  As a result, there has been an unprecedented reshuffling 
of rights provided to citizens by their states and the federal government.39  Now, 
most workers and consumers have access to the courts only when businesses 
permit them, and they have a daunting, if not impossible, task of enforcing their 
legal rights in arbitration because class action bans, cost-shifting provisions, and 
distant forum clauses, among other instruments, make it economically infeasible 
for such individuals to pursue legal remedies.40 
A.  The FAA’s Coverage: From Merchants to Workers 
Expanding the FAA’s coverage to the nation’s workforce required creative 
theorizing because of the law’s narrow commercial origin.  Section 2 of the FAA 
provides: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or 
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement 
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out 
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.41 
Section 1 excludes from coverage “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
                                                 
insulate wrongdoers from liability”).  See also Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 93940 (Trieweiler, J., 
specially concurring) (indicating that federal judges’ misinterpretation of the FAA allows any party 
with sufficient leverage, usually large national corporations, to draft oppressive arbitration policies 
and impose them on weak parties, all the while avoiding procedural and substantive safeguards 
provided by states). 
 38. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, 
Douglas, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (labeling the Court’s doctrine of severability for FAA 
arbitration agreements “fantastic”); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3536 (1984) 
(O’Connor and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s decision to ignore unusually 
clear congressional guidance that the FAA is a procedural device solely for federal courts is an 
“exercise in judicial revisionism [that] goes too far”). 
 39. See Casarotto, 886 P.2d. at 941 (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (stating that the FAA 
precedents “have perverted the purpose of the FAA from one to accomplish judicial neutrality, to 
one of open hostility to any legislative effort to assure that unsophisticated parties to contracts of 
adhesion at least understand the rights they are giving up”).  See also Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 
2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s interpretation of the FAA portends to turn 
arbitration into a device inimical to the meaningful resolution of valid claims). 
 40. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1631, 164952, 1661, 167172 (2005). 
 41. Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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commerce.”42  Section 4 directs federal courts to order arbitration “upon being 
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply 
therewith is not in issue.”43 
In recent years, the Court has interpreted these three provisions to mean that 
the FAA applies to virtually all contracts except employment contracts of 
transportation workers.44  One contracting party may unilaterally decide the 
rules of arbitration, provided that those rules do not restrict legal remedies.45  
Even before the Court came to these conclusions, it ruled that the FAA granted 
to federal courts the power to make substantive law governing the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements, and preempted state laws regulating arbitration 
agreements.46 
These conclusions have triggered a firestorm of criticism because they 
contradict what arbitration is normally understood to be: a fast, fair, and 
inexpensive alternative to litigation.47  Despite the simplicity of the FAA’s text, 
Court interpretations have made it controversial.  Section 2 of the FAA expressly 
extends coverage to transactions involving commerce.48  Section 1 exempted 
seamen, railroad workers, and other workers engaged in foreign and interstate 
commerce from its coverage.49  Although the FAA was enacted in 1925, it was 
not until 2001 that the Court ruled that the FAA applies to all employment 
contracts except those of transportation workers.50  In construing Section 1, the 
Court concluded that its textual exclusion of seamen, railroad employees, and 
workers engaged in interstate commerce demonstrated Congress’s intent to 
                                                 
 42. Id. § 1. 
 43. Id. § 4. 
 44. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). 
 45. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2314, 2317 n.3 (2013). 
 46. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18, 26 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See 
also id. at 26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 47. See Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 748 (1981) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that arbitration is a good alternative for resolving wage and hour claims 
because it is swift, cheap, fair, and presided over by expert neutrals).  Organizations that provide 
arbitration services boast about arbitration’s efficiency and cost effectiveness.  For example, the 
National Arbitration Forum’s website stated that their arbitration process “is the faster, lower cost 
and superior alternative to litigation, that ensures parties receive the same outcomes they would in 
court.”  About the National Arbitration Forum, NAT’L ARB. FORUM, http://test.adrforum.com (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2015).  The American Arbitration Association’s website states that it is “committed 
to making arbitration a faster, more economical alternative to litigation, even in the largest, most 
complex cases.”  Arbitration and Mediation Process, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/ 
aaa/faces/services/arbitrationmediationprocess (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).  Judicial Arbitration 
and Mediation Services’ website states that it “ensure[s] arbitration remains an attractive alternative 
to litigation.”  And its procedural options “save clients time and money.”  ADR Clauses, Rules and 
Procedures, JUDICIAL ARB. & MEDIATION SERVS., http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-clauses/ (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
 48. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 49. Id. § 1. 
 50. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). 
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exclude only a narrow class of employees; namely, transportation workers.51  
The Court has ruled that the law’s text, as well as a canon of construction—
ejusdem generis—command this conclusion.52  According to the Court, any 
other interpretation would be “superfluous” and “pointless,” and would impair 
the reliance interests of employers who had subjected their employees to 
arbitration policies.53  However, the Court initially stayed silent on the question 
of whether unionized employees were also covered by the law.54 
In 2009, the Court expanded the FAA’s coverage by concluding that it also 
applies to labor contracts.55  In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,56 the Court ruled 
that the FAA’s pro-arbitration principles apply to labor contracts that provide 
for arbitration of individual rights.57  In effect, the Court determined that third-
party or union-negotiated contracts with arbitration provisions are as enforceable 
as individual agreements where the parties are in privity.58  The net result is that 
the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate is controlling upon virtually every employee 
who is bound by an arbitration policy.  Only transportation workers’ 
employment contracts escape its clutches.59  From the Court’s perspective, the 
FAA should have broad coverage because the statute was enacted to reverse 
“judicial hostility to [private] arbitration agreements” in general.60  Any 
exemptions should be read narrowly in order to effectuate Congress’s goal.61 
                                                 
 51. Id. at 119.  The Court had an opportunity since the 1950s to say whether the FAA applies 
to employment contracts.  In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, the 
Court was confronted with a labor dispute in which the employer refused to arbitrate, even though 
it had agreed to do so in the collective bargaining contract.  353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957).  Instead of 
relying on the FAA, the only federal law that expressly provided for enforcing arbitration promises, 
the Court utilized Section 301 of the LMRA to create a federal doctrine of enforceability for 
arbitration promises in the employment context.  Id. at 44951.  In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter 
noted that the Court gave the FAA “the silent treatment” because it knew that the FAA excluded 
employment contracts from its coverage, and therefore had to invent an enforcement mandate for 
labor arbitration promises from Section 301 of the LMRA.  Id. at 46667 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 52. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 11415. 
 53. Id. at 118, 123 (stating that an interpretation excluding employment contracts from FAA 
coverage “would call into doubt the efficacy of alternative dispute resolution procedures adopted 
by many of the Nation’s employers”). 
 54. See id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court was silent when it was first 
asked in 1957 to rule that the FAA applies to the enforceability of arbitration agreements in labor 
contracts).  See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 41 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that in 1957, the Court did not overrule lower court holdings that the FAA 
exempted employment and labor contracts, even though it had the opportunity to do so). 
 55. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 255, 260, 274 (2009). 
 56. 556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
 57. Id. at 258. 
 58. Id.  See also Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 n.6. 
(2010) (commenting that the FAA and the LMRA employ the same rules of arbitrability). 
 59. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 60. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 27273 (1995). 
 61. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118 (2001). 
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B.  Looking Away from the Past: The FAA’s Historical Context 
In order to give the FAA such a broad reach, one must ignore the context and 
the era in which the law was enacted.  One core flaw in the Court’s interpretation 
is that employment arbitration as it is known today did not exist in 1925,62 and 
Congress had not yet shaped a national policy on labor arbitration.63  Hence, 
judicial or state hostility to employment or labor arbitration was not a problem 
that commanded Congress’s attention in 1925.64  This means that Congress must 
have been concerned about something else when it exempted seamen and 
railroad employees from the FAA.  Generous legislative history, which the Court 
consciously ignores, shows that in enacting the FAA, Congress wanted to clarify 
that workers involved in interstate commerce, whose employment arrangements 
may be viewed as commercial contracts, were excluded from the Act’s 
coverage.65  Furthermore, through 1925, seamen and railroad workers had their 
own private or administrative processes for resolving workplace disputes.66  This 
                                                 
 62. Up through the first quarter of the twentieth century, liberty of contract principles gave 
employers unfettered discretion over their employment practices.  See Logan Everett Sawyer III, 
Constitutional Principle, Partisan Calculation, and the Beveridge Child Labor Bill, 31 L. & HIST. 
REV. 325, 341 (2013) (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and noting with regard 
to the Court’s pro-liberty of contract holding in that case that “it has been assumed that liberty of 
contract in the early twentieth century would have . . . prevented the federal government [similar 
to state governments] from using any of its enumerated powers to pass a maximum hour law or 
otherwise interfere with the employment relationship”); Michael Pillow, Liberty Over Death: 
Seeking Due Process Dimensions for Freedom of Contract, 8 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 39, 44 (2012) 
(noting that “[t]he concept of liberty of contract as a constitutional right flourished in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”).  Except for workers’ compensation claims for injuries 
on the job, employees had few claims to litigate or arbitrate.  See infra note 72 and accompanying 
text.  Employees gained minimum wage protection in 1938, and additional workplace rights were 
legislated incrementally in the succeeding decades.  See infra notes 99102 and accompanying text. 
 63. See Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 735 (1981) (“The national 
policy favoring collective bargaining and industrial self-government was first expressed in the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 . . . .”). 
 64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  Before and after 1925, state courts decided 
labor or work related disputes using state law, unhampered by jurisdictional challenges created by 
private arbitration agreements.  Id.  Moreover, it was not until 1957 that the Supreme Court declared 
that federal law created by federal courts governed the enforcement of arbitration agreements.  See 
Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 45657 (1957).  While the 
Court also ruled that state courts retained concurrent jurisdiction to decide such disputes, they are 
required to apply federal law.  See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507, 514 
(1962). 
 65. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001).  The Court concluded 
that the text of Section 1 of the FAA alone provides all the answers and that the legislative history 
is “sparse.”  Id. at 119.  See also id. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that legislative 
history makes it clear that fear of oppressive employment arbitration contracts triggered the Section 
1 exemption). 
 66. See id. at 119, 121.  The majority opinion in Circuit City conceded this point, but refused 
to attribute to the exclusion a congressional intent to keep the reach of the FAA narrow.  Id. at 121. 
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explains Congress’s decision to specifically identify these workers as exempted 
from arbitration agreements they could not resist.67 
There is also abundant evidence from the drafters of the FAA that Congress 
was only interested in making enforceable agreements to arbitrate commercial 
disputes.68  This narrower focus logically explains the Section 1 exemption of 
contracts of workers employed in interstate commerce.  So as not to confuse the 
employment contracts of workers in interstate commerce with the business 
contracts of merchants or commercial parties, Congress made clear at the outset 
that any class of workers engaged in interstate commerce was specifically 
excluded from coverage.69  While the Court labeled the legislative history that 
supports this interpretation “sparse,”70 the very nature of arbitration up through 
1925 strongly supports this conclusion. 
At-will employees in the 1920s had few individual rights, and therefore 
almost no basis to file claims in a court or an arbitration forum against their 
employers.71  The few claims that workers typically filed were for injuries 
sustained on the job, and these were governed by workmen compensation laws, 
which established commissions to resolve such claims.72  Railroad employees 
could turn to the Railroad Labor Board if they felt their labor contract rights 
were violated, and the Board functioned as arbitrators.73  Seamen also had their 
own administrative process for resolving disputes.74  Outside of these 
                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 12528 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the FAA’s legislative history).  See 
also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 3942 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(relying on context and legislative history for the conclusion that Congress created the FAA for 
contracts between business people, not adhesion contracts of employment); Wasserman, supra note 
12, at 39698 (further discussing the FAA’s legislative history to indicate that the Act was meant 
to enforce arbitration agreements between commercial entities). 
 69. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 112. 
 70. Id. at 119. 
 71. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908) (holding that there is no justification 
for governmental interference with employers’ and employees’ equal contractual liberties).  See 
also Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539, 545, 562 (1923) (holding that a District of 
Columbia minimum wage law was unconstitutional because it interfered with the private ordering 
of labor prices); Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609 (1936) (holding that New 
York’s minimum wage law violated the Fourteenth Amendment).  Liberty of contract principles 
dominated the labor and employment scene through the first quarter of the twentieth century, and 
these principles prohibited government regulation of the contractual terms on which labor was 
bought and sold.  See, e.g., Adair, 208 U.S. at 172. 
 72. See, e.g., Fisk v. Bonner Tie Co., 232 P. 569, 57071 (Idaho 1925).  See also Van 
Deusen’s Case, 149 N.E. 125, 126 (Mass. 1925); Van Meter v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 
238 Ill. App. 210, 211 (App. Ct. 1925). 
 73. See, e.g., Hoey v. New Orleans Great N. R.R. Co., 105 So. 310, 310 (La. 1925) (discussing 
an employment dispute that had been appealed to and adjudicated by the U.S. Railroad Labor 
Board). 
 74. See, e.g., Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121 (noting that the Shipping Commissioners Act of 
1872 provided for arbitration of seamen’s claims).  Courts were also protective of sailors who might 
be oppressed by arbitral awards.  See The Howick Hall, 10 F.2d 162, 163 (E.D. La. 1925) (rejecting 
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administrative contexts, which did not really constitute private arbitration, state 
courts decided workplace disputes.75 
Through 1925, arbitration agreements had distinctive characteristics.  They 
were voluntary agreements of commercial business people in contracts of 
insurance, ship charters, commercial leases, partnership agreements, goods 
contracts, construction contracts, and other such contracts.76  Arbitration 
provisions were part of the underlying contract or made separately after a dispute 
arose.77  Arbitration agreements did not incorporate statutory or other legal rights 
because the forum change was desired to avoid the delays and costs associated 
with legal rules and procedures as well as inexpert judges.78  This contrasts 
sharply with contemporary arbitration agreements, in which it is typical that only 
the more powerful of the contracting parties desires arbitration, consent is not 
secured on a truly voluntary basis, and the agreement effectively reduces or 
eliminates the substantive rights of the weaker party.79  This reconfiguration of 
arbitration practice could not have been envisioned by the 1925 FAA Congress. 
The interpretation that the FAA applies to labor contracts is even more 
difficult to defend from a historical perspective.  The National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) legally endorsed and promoted labor contracts in 1935,80 ten years 
                                                 
an arbitration decision that concluded it was the employer’s contractual right to unilaterally reduce 
the wages of sailors). 
 75. It was not until 1957 that the Supreme Court decided that labor law was federal law with 
preemptive powers.  See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451 
(1957). 
 76. See generally Atl. Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 F.2d 218, 21821 (2d Cir. 1924) 
(discussing a payment dispute regarding a ship charter); Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean & Elevator 
Co., 232 P. 680, 680 (Colo. 1925) (adjudicating a bean contract dispute); Fernandes Grain Co. v. 
Hunter, 274 S.W. 901, 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925) (examining a wheat contract between members of 
the St. Louis Merchants’ Exchange); Am. Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. N.J. Ins. Co., 148 N.E. 562, 562 
(N.Y. 1925) (discussing an insurance contract dispute between two insurance companies); In re 
Kelley, 147 N.E. 863, 863 (N.Y. 1925) (adjudicating a business dispute between investment 
bankers); Walesby v. Nat’l Polish Indep. Catholic Church, 237 P. 291, 291 (Wash. 1925) 
(examining a construction contract dispute). 
 77. See generally Indus. Ass’n of S.F. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 7475 (1925) (discussing 
a post-dispute agreement to resolve a labor dispute).  See also Killgore v. Dudney, 271 S.W. 966, 
96667 (Ark. 1925) (adjudicating a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate a land sale dispute); City 
State Bank of Chi. v. Detrick, 236 Ill. App. 350, 35157 (App. Ct. 1925) (examining a post-dispute 
arbitration agreement to settle a bank ownership dispute); Forguson v. Newton, 278 S.W. 602, 
60203 (Ky. 1925) (resolving a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate a boundary line property 
dispute); Morgan v. Teel, 234 P. 200, 20001 (Okla. 1925) (discussing a post-dispute agreement 
to arbitrate to resolve an agricultural land lease controversy). 
 78. City State Bank, 236 Ill. App. Ct. at 354 (noting that the parties wanted a neutral individual 
who was an expert at bank audits to decide their dispute). 
 79. See Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 92425 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
unconscionable an employer’s arbitration policy giving it the power to choose the arbitrator and 
requiring employees to pay half of the arbitration fees that could be as high as $14,000 per day). 
 80. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151169 (2012). 
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after the FAA’s enactment.81  Before and after 1925, federal law remained 
hostile to judicial enforcement of executory contracts to arbitrate labor 
disputes.82  Unions also did not want the FAA’s pro-arbitration policies extended 
to labor contracts.83 
The Supreme Court did not address the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements in labor contracts until 1957.84  When the Court finally addressed 
whether a party to a labor contract must honor its promise to arbitrate, no 
mention was made of the FAA as justification for an order compelling 
arbitration.85  Instead, the Court relied on Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act (LMRA), a federal law passed in 1947 that said nothing about 
arbitration.86  The Court interpreted Section 301 of the LMRA as a congressional 
mandate for federal courts to grant specific performance as a remedy for breach 
of a promise to arbitrate, and to fashion federal common law to govern this 
issue.87  This decision implicitly rejected the common law rule of non-
enforcement of executory contracts to arbitrate labor disputes.88 
                                                 
 81. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (originally enacted February 
12, 1925). 
 82. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  This law was originally 
enacted as the Act of March 23, 1932, and broadly denied courts the power to grant injunctions or 
specific performance in labor disputes.  Id. 
 83. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 462 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Restrictions made by legislation like . . . the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
of 1932 . . . upon the use of familiar remedies theretofore available in the federal courts, reflected 
deep fears of the labor movement of the use of such remedies against labor.”). 
 84. See id. at 44959. 
 85. See generally id. at 466 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing the Court’s rejection of 
the FAA for purposes of enforcing “arbitration clauses in collective-bargaining agreements”).  See 
also William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern Labor 
Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 638 (2006) (“No mention was made of the Federal Arbitration Act 
of 1925 and its jurisdiction over the enforceability of ‘contracts of employment’ in Lincoln Mills.”). 
 86. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455 (quoting Section 302 of the House bill as “the 
substantial equivalent of the present § 301”)  Section 302 stated: 
Any action for or proceeding involving a violation of an agreement between an 
employer and a labor organization or other representative of employees may be 
brought by either party in any district court of the United States having 
jurisdiction of the parties, without regard to the amount in controversy, if such 
agreement affects commerce, or the court otherwise has jurisdiction of the 
cause. 
Id. at 455 n.5. 
 87. See id. at 44951, 45256 (interpreting Section 301(b) of the LMRA, which gave a labor 
organization the right to “sue or be sued as an entity and in [sic] behalf of the employees whom it 
represents in the courts of the United States” as evidence of a congressional desire that federal 
courts take jurisdiction, enforce no-strike promises by unions and the arbitration promises by 
employers, and provide sanctions for the breach of such provisions) (citing Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947 § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012)). 
 88. See id. at 45658.  The Court conceded that enforcement of arbitration agreements fell 
squarely within the prohibitions of the Norris La-Guardia Act, but decided there was “no 
justification in policy for restricting § 301(a) to damage suits, leaving specific performance of a 
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The federal common law governing the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements in labor contracts was developed three years later in the Steelworkers 
Trilogy.89  In this trio of cases, the Court relied on the NLRA’s preference for 
private resolution of labor disputes as the antidote for disagreements, such as 
those over the justification for enforcing labor arbitration contracts.90  Although 
a few years earlier in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of 
Alabama,91 the Court was specifically asked to rule that the FAA supported an 
order to compel arbitration under a labor contract, the Court remained silent.92  
In the trilogy, the Court again avoided reliance on the FAA.93 
                                                 
contract to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural requirements of that Act.”  Id.  
The Court commented, “[i]t seems . . . clear to us that Congress adopted a policy which placed 
sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes, by implication rejecting the common-
law rule . . . against enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate.”  Id. at 456 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 89. See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
 90. See Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 566 (holding the congressional preference for private 
resolution found in Section 203(d) of the LMRA should be given “full play”).  See also Warrior & 
Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. at 57780.  The Court noted that: 
The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the collective 
bargaining agreement.  A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a 
provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement. . . .  In the 
commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation.  Here arbitration is the 
substitute for industrial strife. . . .  For arbitration of labor disputes under collective 
bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  See also Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599.  The Court stated: 
[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for 
the arbitrator.  It is the arbitrator’s construction which was bargained for; and so far as 
the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business 
overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his. 
Id. 
 91. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
 92. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 130 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Justice Stevens dissented: 
The fact that the Court relied on § 301 of the LMRA, a statutory provision that does not 
mention arbitration, rather than the FAA, a statute that expressly authorizes the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements, strongly implies that the Court had concluded that 
the FAA simply did not apply because § 1 exempts labor contracts. 
Id. 
 93. See Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local No. 36, AFL-CIO v. Office Ctr. Servs., Inc., 670 F.2d 
404, 407 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that since the Steelworkers Trilogy, “parties to labor arbitration 
agreements have been able to enforce the terms of those agreements directly under section 301 [of 
the LMRA] without reference to the Federal Arbitration Act”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering 
the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the 
Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 259, 305 n.10 (1991) (noting that “the 
Steelworkers Trilogy involved arbitration compelled pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act”). 
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It was not until 2009 that the Court declared that the FAA’s principles are 
equally applicable to labor contracts.94  This interpretation is difficult to square 
with the laws of collective bargaining, which post-date and presumably trump 
the FAA.  Labor contracts are very different from those made in commercial or 
other employment settings because they are made on behalf of workers by 
unions, and unionized workers do not directly participate in contract 
negotiations.95  Furthermore, until recently, the terms of labor contracts did not 
include promises about arbitration as the exclusive forum in which to resolve 
union members’ legal claims.96  Unions and companies typically contract 
exclusively about their private economic interests as well as workplace rules and 
conditions.97  Private bargaining between unions and employers about arbitral 
resolution of workers’ legal claims is a new phenomenon that is still unsettled.98 
The idea that unions could bargain and contract about their members’ public 
rights could not have been envisioned by the FAA Congress because the 
individual employment rights wrapped into arbitration clauses today generally 
did not exist in 1925.99  At that time, employees had few individual rights to 
                                                 
 94. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251, 266, 274 (2009). 
 95. See White v. White Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that unions are 
not required by law to get member approval of negotiated contract terms).  See also O’Neill v. Air 
Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 886 F.2d 1438, 1447 (5th Cir. 1989), rev’d on other grounds 499 U.S. 65 
(1991) (noting that “[t]he law does not require that a collective bargaining agreement be submitted 
to a local union or the union membership for authorization, negotiation or ratification, in the 
absence of an express requirement in the agreement, or in the constitution, by-laws or rules and 
regulations of the union”) (quoting Confederated Indep. Unions v. Rockwell-Standard Co., 465 
F.2d 1137, 1140 (3d Cir. 1972)). 
 96. After laws prohibiting employment discrimination were passed in 1964, unions and 
companies began including in their labor contracts promises of nondiscrimination on the bases 
forbidden by law.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 39 (1974).  These 
provisions added the contractual grievance arbitration forum as a complement or alternative to the 
employees’ statutory court forum, for resolving employment discrimination claims.  Id. at 4042, 
5960.  Contracts with such promises allowed unionized workers to pursue a breach of contract 
grievance about discrimination, without limiting their legal right to go to court about the same 
matter.  See id. at 36, 43, 47, 49.  The Court stated that “[t]here is no suggestion in the statutory 
scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual’s right to sue or divests federal 
courts of jurisdiction.”  Id. at 47.  See also 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 260 (holding that 
Gardner-Denver Co. addressed the preclusive effects of arbitrating contractual rights, not 
agreements to waive a statutory forum). 
 97. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 251. 
 98. Id. at 27374 (noting that the effect of a union’s refusal to arbitrate a claim after it waived 
an employee’s court forum rights is an open question). 
 99. For example, minimum wage and overtime laws emanated from the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, which was passed in 1938.  See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (2012).  The 
laws prohibiting employment discrimination originated with Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).  See also Gilles, supra note 35, at 39596 (noting that corporate 
scheming to use arbitration policies as a shield from legal liability is a relatively new phenomenon 
made possible by the Court’s FAA decisions). 
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vindicate because liberty of contract principles ruled the day.100  When various 
individual rights laws were enacted in the succeeding decades after the FAA was 
passed, they reflected a congressional policy of increasing rather than 
diminishing the contractual rights that employees gained from collective 
bargaining.101  This was reflected in the Court’s ruling that unions and 
companies could not contractually bind workers to arbitral resolution of the 
workers’ legal claims.102 
The concern about companies and unions sacrificing workers’ individual 
rights in labor contracts through arbitration agreements remains vibrant,103 and 
serves as a further source of worry about the Court’s conclusion that the FAA 
applies to labor contracts.  That it took eighty-four years for the Court to reach 
this result, despite past opportunities to do so, strongly supports the claim that 
the Court’s interpretation of this aspect of the FAA is tendentious.  Historical 
arbitration practices before and after the FAA was enacted, and statutory 
developments after 1925, confirm that Congress did not contemplate the 
application of the FAA to employees generally. 
II.  THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
The Court’s jurisprudence on the enforceability of arbitration agreements, 
which are often part of a broader contract, is also defective.  The FAA provides 
that an arbitration provision in a contract is as valid and enforceable as any other 
contractual agreement.104  Although the Court has ruled that arbitration 
agreements have equal status—but not superior status—to other contractual 
                                                 
 100. It was not until 1936 that the Supreme Court began paring back its broad liberty of 
contract doctrine, which paved the way for progressive legislation that benefitted workers.  See W. 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 383 (1936) (holding that legislatures can regulate with 
minimum wage laws because liberty of contract is not an express and unrestrained Fourteenth 
Amendment right but rather a qualified right). 
 101. See, e.g., Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 43, 4749.  The Court noted: 
[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an 
individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable 
state and federal statutes.  The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to 
supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment 
discrimination. 
Id. at 4849. 
 102. See id. at 47 (holding that employees were not required to exhaust a private grievance 
arbitration process, and courts do not have to defer to arbitral awards, in matters involving the 
vindication of employees’ statutory civil rights). 
 103. See Maalik v. Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors, 437 F.3d 650, 65354 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that union officers were complicit in racially discriminatory practices under a collective 
bargaining contract).  See also Blue v. Int’l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 159, 676 F.3d 579, 
581 (7th Cir. 2012) (upholding a trial court ruling that union officials retaliated against a union 
employee because she complained about race discrimination in the union’s job referral program). 
 104. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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promises,105 its rules of enforceability have made arbitration agreements a 
superior option to other contractual promises. 
The Court has grounded most of its arbitration rules in the FAA’s goal of 
enforcing the parties’ contractual desire.106  According to the Court, priority 
should be given to the arbitration contract because that document reflects the 
parties’ design of an adjudicative process that suits their needs.107  For example, 
parties can make the arbitration process efficient and confidential, or they can 
require arbitrators who have specialized competence in the matter being 
arbitrated.108  While this was true in 1925, the arbitration agreement is not 
necessarily a bargained bilateral affair today.109  The Court’s emphasis on 
enforcing what the parties consented to ignores the fact that in most cases today, 
one party’s consent is effectively involuntary, and the terms of the arbitration 
contract are written solely by the more powerful party in order to further that 
party’s legal interests.110  By ignoring this development, the Court requires 
enforcement of lopsided arbitration contracts in the same way as arms-length or 
more evenly-balanced contracts.  As a result, weak parties must arbitrate even 
                                                 
 105. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 27071 (1995) (stating that 
“when Congress passed the Arbitration Act in 1925, it . . . . intended courts to ‘enforce [arbitration] 
agreements into which parties had entered’”) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).  See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (stating that the FAA’s “purpose was to reverse the longstanding 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been 
adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other 
contracts”). 
 106. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (holding that the FAA 
Congress’s purpose was “to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate” 
and that the FAA’s “overriding goal” was “to promote the expeditious resolution of claims”); Volt, 
489 U.S. at 478 (holding that the “principal purpose” of the FAA is the enforcement of private 
arbitration contracts). 
 107. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“The point of 
affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined 
procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”). 
 108. See id. at 1749. 
 109. See, e.g., id. at 1744 (noting that “[t]he agreement authorized AT&T to make unilateral 
amendments”).   See also, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment 
Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 450 (2006).  Bales writes: 
Few would doubt that an average employee presented by her employer with an 
employment arbitration agreement on a “take-it-or-be-fired” basis faces substantial 
economic pressure to sign the agreement.  Some courts have concluded from this that 
pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements are not voluntary and therefore are 
unenforceable.  However, employees must accept on a “take-it-or-be-fired” basis a 
substantial number of other employment terms, such as rate-of-pay and work-hours. 
Id. 
 110. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  See also infra note 268 and accompanying 
text. 
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when the arbitration contract includes rules that make it practically infeasible to 
pursue their legal rights.111 
The Court has also insulated the arbitration contract from common contract 
defenses to enforcement by giving the promise to arbitrate special status.  For 
example, while provisions in other contracts generally fail when the contract is 
voided because of contractual defenses such as failure of consideration, duress, 
or fraud, this is not necessarily true of arbitration provisions.112  Even if the entire 
contract is alleged to be defective, the Court has held that the arbitration clause 
survives unless it is proved that the arbitration clause itself is defective.113  This 
severability rule was subsequently expanded to permit arbitral determination of 
enforceability issues, including the validity of the arbitration clause itself, if the 
contract delegates such authority to the arbitrator.114 
The Court has created a federal substantive rule of severability that effectively 
allows a powerful party to place arbitrability issues outside the reach of courts.115  
The Court interpreted the FAA’s Section 4 statement that a court must compel 
arbitration if “the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue” as 
a congressional command to sever and enforce arbitration promises, even when 
the underlying contract that contains the arbitration clause fails.116  The Court 
had no textual or legislative direction to do this because the FAA does not 
provide for the severing of an arbitration clause.117  Legislative evidence 
suggests that the FAA proceeds on the assumption that the parties have a valid 
contract, and requires courts to enforce that contract’s arbitration provision.118 
                                                 
 111. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).  Jeffrey L. 
Oldham & Yvonne Y. Ho, Avoiding Class Arbitrations: Italian Colors and Beyond, 65 THE 
ADVOC. (TEXAS) 20, 20 (2013) (noting that the Court in American Express “requires strict 
enforcement of contractual provisions waiving the right to class arbitrations . . . even as applied to 
a federal statutory claim, and even if the cost of litigating on an individualized basis is economically 
infeasible”). 
 112. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 40304, 406 (1967). 
 113. See id.  See also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006).  
The Court stated: 
Prima Paint resolved this conundrum—and resolved it in favor of the separate 
enforceability of arbitration provisions.  We reaffirm today that, regardless of whether 
the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract 
as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator. 
Id. 
 114. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 277779 (2010) (holding that the 
FAA supports agreements to arbitrate gateway issues of arbitrability unless the delegation provision 
itself is challenged as infirm). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 2776. 
 117. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 116 (2012). 
 118. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 41213 (Black, J., dissenting).  The FAA provides no 
guidance about whether arbitration agreements should be treated as entire or severable contracts.  
Id. 
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Section 2 of the FAA states that courts must enforce an arbitration agreement 
in a contract, not an arbitration agreement in a void, voidable, or unenforceable 
contract.119  This interpretation acknowledges the fact that the parties’ concern 
about disputes arising under the broader underlying contract led them to include 
an arbitration provision.  The only standalone arbitration agreements Congress 
contemplated in 1925 were those for post-dispute arbitration contracts, and the 
FAA specifically provided for such agreements.120  Furthermore, there is scant 
evidence that the FAA Congress desired to displace state rules of severability or 
any common law rule of severability that focuses on the parties’ intent.121 
Today, contracting parties can make standalone predispute arbitration 
agreements, and parties sometimes attempt to unilaterally amend an existing 
contract to add or modify an arbitration provision.122  During the pre-FAA era, 
such agreements were usually part and parcel of an underlying contract to ship 
goods, build structures, provide insurance, and execute other functions.123  
Standalone arbitration agreements were generally only seen in post-dispute 
cases, and the FAA Congress addressed such agreements.124  Section 2 of the 
FAA provides that a court must order arbitration if there is “an agreement in 
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract.”125  This provision permits parties to make a separate post-dispute 
agreement to arbitrate, as contrasted with a predispute provision, which is 
normally a clause in the underlying contract.126  The imposition of separate pre-
                                                 
 119. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 120. Id. (providing for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate existing disputes). 
 121. See JOSEPH L. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 1, 44748 (5th ed. 
2003) (noting that “whether a contract is divisible is a question of interpretation or one of the 
intention of the parties”).  See also Polk v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 151 N.E. 808, 810 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1925).  The Ohio Court of Appeals stated: 
If a contract is to be adjudged a severable contract rather than an entire one, it is because, 
by a judicial interpretation thereof, it appears that it was contemplated and intended by 
the parties that the nature and purposes of its subject-matter, and its various terms, were 
to be divisible and independent of each other, and that the parties intended that each 
provision therein stand as a contract between them, independent of the other terms or 
agreements. 
Id. 
 122. Today, powerful parties reserve the right to make unilateral changes.  See AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (“The agreement authorized AT&T to make 
unilateral amendments, which it did to the arbitration provision on several occasions.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5. F.2d 218 (1924) (concerning an 
arbitration agreement in a ship charter contract). 
 124. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  See also supra Morgan v. Teel, 234 P. 200, 200 (Okla. 1925) 
(concerning a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate a land lease controversy); Killgore v. Dudney, 
271 S.W. 966, 966 (Ark. 1925) (concerning a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate a land sale 
dispute). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  See also Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 
393, 398 (2004) (noting that Section 2 of the FAA “provides that both pre-dispute and post-dispute 
arbitration agreements” are enforceable); Adam D. Maarec et al., The CFPB’s Final Report on Pre-
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dispute arbitration agreements on workers and consumers after the underlying 
relationship is established is a relatively new phenomenon only made possible 
by the Court’s FAA jurisprudence.127  Today, the powerful parties who desire 
arbitration have no incentive to wait until after a dispute arises to propose 
arbitration which can be rejected by weak parties.  They have the legal right to 
unilaterally draft and implement arbitration rules before a dispute occurs, and 
this has made the FAA’s post-dispute provision a dead letter.128 
By creating and imposing federal rules of severability for the FAA, the Court 
has forced judges to isolate arbitration clauses when challenges are made, and 
ignore the rest of the contract.  Any rule that treats a contract as “entire” or 
determines severability as a factual question, is displaced.129  Despite the 
absence of textual support, the Court has ruled that Congress could not have 
intended federal courts to decide non-arbitration contractual issues such as 
fraud.130  As a result, weak parties cannot delay arbitration by litigating the 
validity of the whole contract, but strong parties can delay arbitration and the 
vindication of statutory rights by implementing oppressive arbitration policies 
that consumers and employees must first prove are unconscionable before 
proceeding with their legal claim. 
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc., v. Jackson,131 the Court stated that even if an 
employee alleges that the entire agreement that contains an arbitration clause is 
unconscionable, he must still arbitrate this claim if a provision in the contract 
                                                 
Dispute Arbitration Clauses, PAYMENTLAWADVISOR (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.paymentlaw 
advisor.com/2015/03/16/the-cfpbs-final-report-on-pre-dispute-arbitration-clauses/ (commenting 
that “[m]any contracts for consumer financial products and services include a ‘pre-dispute 
arbitration clause’”). 
 127. Relying on the Court’s FAA decisions, businesses have added arbitration agreements to 
existing contractual relationships such as employment and consumer transactions.  See Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (noting that private parties likely wrote 
arbitration contracts in reliance on the Court’s holding that states are preempted from specifically 
targeting certain aspects of arbitration agreements as unenforceable).  See also id. at 28384 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[P]arties have undoubtedly made contracts in reliance on the Court’s 
interpretation of the Act . . . .”).  In his dissent, Justice Thomas stated, “I do not doubt that 
innumerable contracts containing arbitration clauses have been written since 1984, or that arbitrable 
disputes might yet arise out of a large proportion of these contracts.”  Id. at 295 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 128. In fact, a post-dispute contracting approach to arbitration agreements is precisely what 
opponents to the Court’s FAA precedents would prefer.  For example, one proposed piece of 
legislation, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, provided that “[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of this title, no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires 
arbitration of an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.”  
See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. § 402(a) (2013). 
 129. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 40204 (1967).  The 
Court stated that “a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and performance 
of the agreement to arbitrate.”  Id. at 404. 
 130. See id. 
 131. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
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delegates resolution of contract formation issues to the arbitrator.132  The Court 
reasoned that the arbitration agreement itself is the underlying contract, and the 
delegation provision is the specific element in dispute.133  When an employee 
does not challenge the validity of the delegation clause itself, a court must allow 
the arbitrator to decide the allegation of whether the overall arbitration contract 
is unconscionable.134  In effect, the Court announced a double-severability rule 
that makes it impractical to avoid arbitral determination of gateway issues, 
contrary to the historical reality that arbitration agreements were not independent 
contracts.135 
This view of the FAA cannot be squared with the general absence of 
standalone arbitration agreements up through 1925, and the nonexistence of 
arbitration for employment disputes until relatively recently.136  It also cannot 
be reconciled with the FAA mandate for court enforcement when a valid contract 
containing an arbitration clause exists.137  In effect, the severability rules force 
courts to evaluate arbitration agreements as independent contracts when in 
reality they normally incorporate by reference or relate to some other contractual 
relationship.138 
The severability rules announced by the Court have far-reaching implications 
for workers and consumers who typically enter into non-bargained 
transactions.139  For example, at-will employees who have no employment 
                                                 
 132. See id. at 277778.  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated, “[t]he delegation 
provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.”  Id. 
at 2777. 
 133. Id. at 2779.  The Court observed that in this case the arbitration contract was the 
underlying agreement, but then decided it did not matter whether this was so or whether it was part 
of a single broader contract, as the rule of severability still applied.  See id. at 277981 (noting that 
unless the delegation provision is challenged specifically, a court must enforce it, and leave 
challenges to the validity of the entire contract to arbitration). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See, e.g., Polk v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 151 N.E. 808, 81011 (Ohio Ct. App. 1925) (holding 
that an arbitration clause cannot be severed from the underlying contract). 
 136. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745, 175051 (2011).  The Court 
noted that the FAA was “enacted . . . in response to widespred judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements,” and that “class arbitration was not even envisioned” by the FAA Congress.  Id. at 
1745, 1751. 
 137. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
47475 (1989). 
 138. See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781, 278688 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Parties have no need to make arbitration agreements unless they have some other 
relationship, because such agreements only provide a vehicle for settling disputes emanating from 
that other relationship; therefore, it is an anomaly to enforce arbitration agreements when no legal 
relationship exists or alternatively to allow arbitral determination of whether any relationship exists.  
See generally id. (criticizing the implications of the severability rule implemented by the majority). 
 139. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 94041 (Mont. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Doctor’s 
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1995) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (observing 
that large businesses propose arbitration policies that are non-negotiable in form contracts to weak 
parties who must either accept them or lose the business opportunities such contracts would 
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contract140 are still bound to arbitrate employment disputes if an employer 
unilaterally implements an arbitration policy without any consultation with the 
worker.141  An at-will worker is bound even if the employer gave no real 
consideration for the employee’s promise to give up his legal right to litigate 
disputes, and the employee had no input in fashioning the terms of the arbitration 
policy.142 
Even when the arbitration policy exempts the employer from arbitrating the 
employer’s claims, thereby creating the prospect of piecemeal, expensive, and 
protracted litigation, courts are required to enforce the arbitration 
“agreement.”143  The Court cites no statutory authorization of such practices that 
                                                 
otherwise enable them to access).  The Supreme Court of Montana noted that “[w]hat these 
interpretations do, in effect, is permit a few major corporations to draft contracts regarding their 
relationship with others that immunizes them from accountability under the laws of the states where 
they do business, and by the courts in those states.”  Id. at 941 (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).  
See also Sandip H. Patel, Note, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution Rights in 
Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481, 512 (1996) (“[M]ost standard employment contracts are 
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”) (citing JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 
CONTRACTS § 1-3, at 6 (3d ed. 1987)). 
 140. See PERILLO, supra note 121, at 60.  At-will employment is grounded in non-committal 
promises of the employee and employer that are insufficient to legally bind them; either party can 
terminate the relationship with impunity at any time and for any reason.  Id.  Prohibitions against 
termination grounded in public policies are not part of the parties’ contractual agreement, although 
this is being reversed “in many jurisdictions in cases where the discharge is contrary to public 
policy.”  See id.  But see Morrow v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 273 S.W.3d 15, 2627 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2008) (stating that at-will employment is not valid consideration to support an arbitration promise); 
Whitworth v. McBride & Son Homes, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (providing 
that continued at-will employment is not valid consideration to support an arbitration promise). 
 141. See generally Sprinkle v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., No. C09-1672Z, 2010 WL 1330328, 
at *34, 710 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 2010) (finding an arbitration agreement not to be unilateral 
because both parties are bound by its terms and restricted in the claims they can bring outside the 
scope of the agreement); Marotta v. Toll Bros., No. 09-2328, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20578, at *15 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010) (finding that a contract is not unconscionable merely because there is 
inequality in bargaining power; thus, it is an insufficient argument for finding an arbitration 
agreement unenforceable). 
 142. Marotta, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20578, at *15.  Courts generally hold that mutual 
promises to arbitrate are sufficient to make arbitration contracts binding.  See In re Halliburton Co., 
80 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2002) (noting that when an employee “reported for work,” he acceded 
to his employer’s arbitration program).  However, an employer cannot retain the unilateral power 
to amend the arbitration policy, or else the employer’s promises with regard to such policy will be 
treated as illusory.  Id.  See also Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770, 77576 (2014) 
(providing that continued at-will employment and employer’s unilateral power to modify its 
arbitration promise make such agreements void). 
 143. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 1920 (1983).  
Only if the employer retains the unilateral right to avoid arbitrating the claims it agreed to arbitrate, 
does it run into mutuality of obligations problems.  See Flex Enters. LP v. Cisneros, 442 S.W.3d 
725, 72728 (Tex. App. 2014), petition for review denied, (Tex. Dec. 19, 2014) (noting that non-
disclosure, non-compete, and non-interference claims were excluded from the arbitration 
agreement, but also that the employer reserved the right to change the arbitration policy at any time 
without notice, thereby making it illusory). 
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defeat the purpose of the FAA to enforce a contractual change by both parties to 
an efficient private forum.144  The FAA was enacted because both parties wanted 
to avoid the delays and costs of courts.145  It was not designed to force one party 
to arbitrate at all times while allowing the other party to arbitrate at its leisure. 
While the Court has interpreted the FAA to require the parties’ consent in 
order to find arbitration agreements valid,146 its response to involuntary 
arbitration contract formation practices negates the refrain that consent is key.  
Although it is theoretically true that general contract law enforces one-sided or 
adhesion contracts,147 neither contract law nor the FAA were intended to enforce 
agreements that remove the benefit of the bargain from one party or remove that 
party’s legal rights and remedies.148  Yet, the Court has ruled that arbitration 
clauses are valid even when they do just that.149  The Court has approved as valid 
arbitration agreements in standalone contracts where all the terms of the contract 
give the employer or business an overwhelmingly favorable position, and 
simultaneously give the employee or consumer a decidedly disadvantageous 
position.150 
While adhesion contracts are a normal part of commercial life today, 
enforcing contracts that degrade one party’s legal rights as a condition of doing 
business is not a purpose of the FAA.151  General contract law seeks to give the 
                                                 
 144. Id. at 728. 
 145. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 22, 27.  Congress’s “clear intent” in passing the 
FAA was “to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly 
and easily as possible.”  Id. at 22. 
 146. See also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 177576 (2010) 
(holding that the parties’ silence on class arbitration cannot be interpreted as consent). 
 147. See PERILLO, supra note 121, at 399 (“There is nothing inherently wrong with contracts 
of adhesion.  Most of the transactions of daily life involve such contracts that are drafted by one 
party and presented on a take it or leave it basis.  They simplify standard transactions such as 
obtaining or using a credit card.”).  In many cases, such contracts are reasonable.  Id.  See also 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (noting that “the times in which 
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past”). 
 148. See PERILLO, supra note 121, at 382, 384, 38890 (discussing the doctrine of 
unconscionability).  Perillo and Calamari note, “[t]ypically the cases in which courts have found 
unconscionability involve gross overall one-sidedness or gross one-sidedness of a term disclaiming 
a warranty, limiting damages, or granting procedural advantages.”  Id. at 389. 
 149. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 231012 (2013) (approving 
an arbitration policy that made it practically impossible to prosecute antitrust violations because of 
its class claim prohibitions).  The Court held that an exception to the FAA’s enforceability rules 
providing that courts could void arbitration agreements that precluded “effective[] vindicati[on]” 
of “federal statutory rights” did not apply to a waiver of class arbitration rights.  Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1332, 1334 (11th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2886 (2014).  By denying certiorari in Walthour, the Court 
effectively approved the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that employers can use arbitration policies to 
bar class action claims of employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  See id. 
 151. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 47475 (1989) (noting that the FAA does not provide an absolute right to forced arbitration).  
See generally Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute 
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parties the benefit of the bargain rather than give the strong bargainer a windfall 
or strip the legal rights of the weaker party.152  Yet, the Court has in essence 
approved such consequences when they are cloaked in an arbitration policy or 
provision.153  These conclusions give arbitration agreements a status superior to 
other contractual promises, contrary to the contemplation of the FAA.154 
A.  FAA Defenses 
The Court has also stripped away traditional defenses to contract enforcement 
by molding the goals of the FAA.155  Textually, the FAA promises to enforce 
arbitration agreements, subject to all the defenses applicable to any contract.156  
However, the Court’s interpretation greatly narrows the range of defenses that 
can be applied to arbitration agreements.157  For example, the Court ruled that 
                                                 
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 949, 104041 (2000) (discussing the fact 
that a waiver of rights under the FAA is not all-encompassing). 
 152. See PERILLO, supra note 121, at 382, 384, 38890 (discussing the goals of the 
unconscionability doctrine). 
 153. See, e.g., Marotta v. Toll Bros., No. 09-2328, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20578, at *15 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 3, 2010) (holding that traditional defenses against upholding a contract such as fraud or 
duress can invalidate the enforcement of an arbitration agreement); see also supra note 149 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Court’s upholding of a provision that prevented a party from 
exercising its class arbitration rights).  Richard Frankel, who is of the view that the doctrine of 
unconscionability withstands the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, nonetheless notes: 
A number of scholars have suggested that Concepcion’s holding that the FAA can 
preempt state unconscionability doctrine and its focus on “fundamental attributes” of 
arbitration means that the FAA preempts most, or even all, unconscionability challenges 
to arbitration provisions.  Defense-oriented organizations are advising defense lawyers 
“to be very bullish” in pushing Concepcion well beyond the class action context in order 
“to enforce arbitration clauses in general,” and courts already have cited the two cases 
more than one thousand times. 
Richard Frankel, Concepcion and Mis-Concepcion: Why Unconscionability Survives the Supreme 
Court’s Arbitration Jurisprudence, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 225, 227 (2014) (footnotes omitted). 
 154. Volt, 489 U.S. at 472.  See also supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 155. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2223 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  Dissenting in Southland, Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, stated: 
Today, the Court takes the facial silence of § 2 as a license to declare that state as well as 
federal courts must apply § 2.  In addition, though this is not spelled out in the opinion, 
the Court holds that in enforcing this newly discovered federal right state courts must 
follow procedures specified in § 3.  The Court’s decision is impelled by an 
understandable desire to encourage the use of arbitration, but it utterly fails to recognize 
the clear congressional intent underlying the FAA.  Congress intended to require federal, 
not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements. 
Id. 
 156. See Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2886 (2014) (“The FAA’s primary substantive provision provides that a 
written agreement to arbitrate a controversy arising out of that contract ‘shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.’”) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
 157. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 68687 (1996) (noting that “generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability” may be used against 
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states cannot pass laws that limit the enforceability of arbitration agreements.158  
Although the FAA does not expressly preempt state arbitration laws and does 
not completely occupy the field of arbitration, the Court has held that the FAA 
preempts state laws that serve as obstacles to arbitration.159  This has 
immobilized state enactments designed to protect consumers and workers from 
the abuses that pervade arbitration policies.160  The Court does not distinguish 
between regulations that promote the arbitration goals of speed, reduced costs, 
and fairness, and those that outright prohibit arbitration of certain types of 
disputes.161  This failure has degraded the value of common law defenses to 
enforceability. 
The Court’s foundational rule that insistence on arbitration is a federal 
substantive right that has few legal constraints has degraded the potency of 
common law defenses such as fraud, duress, unconscionability, and lack of 
mutuality.162  Because arbitration is the legal prerogative of anyone, powerful 
parties need not misrepresent, defraud, or coerce the weak party to obtain such 
an agreement.163  The absence of alternatives for weak parties guarantees their 
acceptance or acquiescence.164  Additionally, because both parties are agreeing 
to give up their court forum rights or are trading other legal rights along with the 
promise to arbitrate, mutuality can often be found by applying ordinary contract 
                                                 
arbitration agreements under the FAA, but that “state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions” 
may not be used). 
 158. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 1416 (1984).  The Court stated that 
“Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements.”  Id. at 16. 
 159. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
468, 478 (1989). 
 160. See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.  See also Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Investor 
Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 2 (2012) (noting that 
“[t]he United States Supreme Court, in advancing an aggressive pro-arbitration campaign since the 
mid-1980s, transformed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)—enacted in 1925 and not amended 
materially since then—from a statute that forbids judicial discrimination against arbitration 
agreements to a powerful source of anti-consumer substantive arbitration law”). 
 161. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (noting that any state laws applicable only to arbitration 
provisions and that invalidate arbitration agreements, including “state legislation requiring greater 
information or choice in the making of agreements to arbitrate than in other contracts” are 
preempted by the FAA). 
 162. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 231011 (2013) (declining 
to apply the “effective vindication” exception to invalidate an arbitration agreement, and noting 
that while it is possible that arbitration expenses could preclude individuals from exercising their 
federal statutory rights, this does not preclude such individuals from seeking remedies). 
 163. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Doctor’s 
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1995) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (commenting 
that due to a lack of alternatives, weak parties are easily induced into arbitration agreements). 
 164. See id. (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).  See also supra note 162 and accompanying 
text. 
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rules.165  However, powerful parties abuse their arbitration contract formation 
prerogatives by inserting obstacles to the vindication of legal remedies, and this 
abuse has been the only real basis upon which to deploy a general contract 
defense of unconscionability.166 
Nonetheless, Court precedents have even curtailed the availability of the 
doctrine of unconscionability.167  This equitable and dynamic principle, which 
is used to prevent enforcement of oppressive contract terms regardless of the 
types of contracts that house them, has been paralyzed by the Court’s conclusion 
that the FAA permits modification of procedural rights in arbitration 
agreements.168  Powerful bargainers are given wide latitude to modify or 
eliminate rights as long as they can be labeled procedural.169  By labeling 
statutory prescriptions as procedural rights or non-rights,170 the Court has also 
greatly reduced the prospect of proving unconscionability by approving 
arbitration provisions that place procedural and financial hurdles in the path of 
weak parties.171  The Court ruled that unless hurdles such as class action bans 
and cost-allocation provisions literally prevent the other party from pursuing 
their legal remedies, the arbitration requirements must be enforced because 
effective vindication is still possible.172  Thus, showing that arbitration 
agreements are structured in such a way that they make the pursuit of legal rights 
                                                 
 165. The mutuality of obligation doctrine does not require that the parties exchange the same 
promises, for example, both parties agreeing to give up the court forum; as long as something of 
legal value was bargained for, consideration exists to bind both parties.  See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 
Brooks, 207 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that mutual promises to arbitrate are 
sufficient consideration to support an arbitration contract). 
 166. See, e.g., Hill v. Garda CL, Nw., Inc., 308 P.3d 635, 639 (Wash. 2013) (holding that a 
fourteen-day statute of limitations, a limit on backpay damages to two and four months, and high 
arbitration costs made the arbitration agreement unconscionable); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
328 F.3d 1165, 117273 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that Circuit City’s arbitration policy was 
unconscionable because “provisions concerning coverage of claims, the statute of limitations, the 
prohibition of class actions, the filing fee, cost-splitting, remedies, and Circuit City’s unilateral 
power to modify or terminate the arbitration agreement all operate to benefit the employer 
inordinately at the employee’s expense”). 
 167. See infra notes 16874. 
 168. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) 
(holding that a forum change in an arbitration agreement is enforceable as long as federal statutory 
rights can be vindicated); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) 
(holding that a forum change in an arbitration agreement does not equate to a loss of substantive 
rights). 
 169. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) (holding that 
arbitration agreements that modify rights are enforceable, as long as they do not preclude legal 
remedies). 
 170. See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 66970 (2012) (finding that 
a congressional provision giving consumers a “right to sue” is not necessarily a right to go to court). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2311. 
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futile makes little impression on the Court.173  Even when employees and 
consumers surmount the daunting rules and prove that arbitration terms are 
unconscionable, they face the reality that they may still have to arbitrate with 
modified or severed terms.174 
Considered together, the Court’s FAA decisions make almost everyone 
subject to the law’s pro-arbitration mandates, fortify the position of powerful 
bargainers to require arbitration with obstacles to vindication, eliminate the 
defenses normally available for such contractual oppression, and negate the 
ability of states to regulate arbitration in a way that promotes the goals of the 
FAA.175  But the Court has not limited its preemptive and substantive rules for 
the FAA to state laws designed to protect their citizens from oppressive 
contracts.176  The FAA has also overtaken federal laws protecting weak and 
vulnerable contracting parties.177 
B.  The FAA and Federal Laws 
Although the FAA is one narrow federal prescription, it arguably has a 
deleterious effect on other federal laws.178  Moreover, the FAA has paralyzed 
other federal statutes that post-date it, which has been cause for stinging 
criticism.  Some members of the Court have accused the majority of “statutory 
mutilation,”179 “playing ostrich,”180 “misuse[] [of] authority,”181 “building . . . , 
case by case, an edifice of its own creation,”182 and “standing on its own 
shoulders.”183  The beneficiaries of the Court’s FAA decisions have typically 
                                                 
 173. See id. at 230809 (upholding class claim prohibitions that made it financially untenable 
for merchants to pursue antitrust claims against American Express). 
 174. See, e.g., Jackson v. Cintas Corp., 425 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that the 
general rule is to sever unconscionable terms when they are found in contracts). 
 175. See supra notes 16071. 
 176. See, e.g., Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2308 (noting that courts have held that the FAA 
trumps state law). 
 177. Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court is applying the FAA in a manner 
that is inimical to federal antitrust law). 
 178. See id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Court has no basis for using the FAA 
to trump other federal laws).  See also Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 941 (Mont. 1994), 
rev’d sub nom. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1995) (observing that some 
courts’ interpretation of the FAA raises serious separation of powers issues).  The Supreme Court 
of Montana noted in Casarotto that “Congress, according to some federal decisions, has written 
state and federal courts out of business as far as [certain large] corporations are concerned.”  Id. 
 179. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416 (1967) (Black, 
Douglas, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting). 
 180. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 128 (2001) (Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
 181. Id. at 132 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, JJ., dissenting). 
 182. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 183. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, JJ., dissenting). 
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been powerful parties, and the losers have been workers, consumers, and small 
businesses.184 
Federal laws protecting workers and consumers have been compromised 
because of the Court’s interpretations of the FAA.  Take for example the plight 
of over 130 million workers covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).185  
This law regulates minimum wage and overtime pay issues, and was enacted 
primarily to protect “the unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the 
nation’s working population; that is, those employees who lacked sufficient 
bargaining power to secure for themselves a minimum subsistence wage.”186  
The FLSA Congress recognized that hourly workers lacked bargaining power 
and wanted to prevent employment arrangements that harmed them and the 
nation’s health and efficiency.187  That concern remains critical today, 
particularly in light of a variety of schemes to cheat workers out of their 
minimum wages and overtime pay.188 
                                                 
 184. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 93839 (Mont. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Doctor’s 
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1995) (upholding a state law that required conspicuous 
notice of arbitration on the first page of such an agreement).  One judge wrote, “[w]e have laws to 
protect our citizens from bad faith, fraud, unfair business practices, and oppression by the many 
large national corporations who control many aspects of their lives but with whom they have no 
bargaining power.”  Id. at 93940 (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).  The judge further stated: 
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially at the appellate level, to 
understand is that due to their misinterpretation of congressional intent when it enacted 
the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive assumption that arbitration provisions 
and choice of law provisions are knowingly bargained for, all of these procedural 
safeguards and substantive laws are easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to 
stick a choice of law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed contract and require 
the party with inferior bargaining power to sign it. 
Id. at 940.  The holding was later reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 517 
U.S. at 688.  See also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2310, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (observing that the Court is converting arbitration into “a mechanism easily made to 
block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability” while 
undermining “the Sherman Act and other federal statutes providing rights of action”); CompuCredit 
Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 679 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s 
interpretation that the right to sue is not a right to go to court “permits credit repair organizations 
to deny consumers, through fine print in a contract, an important right whose disclosure is decreed 
in the U.S. Code”). 
 185. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (2012) (providing for 
minimum wage and overtime pay for certain classes of workers).  See also FACT SHEET #14: 
COVERAGE UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & 
HOUR DIV. (2009), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs14.pdf (reporting that more 
than 130 million American workers are covered or protected by the FLSA). 
 186. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945). 
 187. Id. at 70607 (discussing the legislative intent underlying the FLSA). 
 188. See Lisa Nagele, State High Court Affirms $187 Million Award on Wal-Mart Employees’ 
Wage & Hour Claims, 241 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) A-2 (Dec. 16, 2014) (reporting the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s confirmation of employees’ claims that an employer denied rest 
breaks and forced employees to work off-the-clock); Anna Kwidzinski, 21,000 Workers at Apple 
Stores, Corporate May Advance Denied Break Claims as Class, 142 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) 
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The Court’s FAA precedents now require judges to interpret the FAA as 
permitting employers to structure arbitration policies that insulate them from 
wage claim violations.189  Using the Court’s precedents as their guide, employers 
have designed and imposed arbitration rules for FLSA claims.190  Although the 
FLSA expressly states that covered workers have the right to maintain an action 
in state or federal court, and may do so as a class,191 employers are requiring that 
workers give up their court forum and class rights as a condition of 
employment.192  Because of the Court’s FAA jurisprudence, lower courts have 
enforced such arbitration agreements, although the prospect that employees will 
file individual claims is slim given the small sums involved in FLSA cases.193 
Although the FLSA is a federal law and does not face the same preemption 
hurdles as state laws, it has been no match for the FAA.194  The Court’s FAA 
precedents have overtaken the FLSA when the two laws conflict.  According to 
one court, workers must arbitrate their FLSA claims individually if they so 
agree, although the FLSA expressly provides for suit in state or federal court, as 
an individual or as a class.195  To guarantee a court forum or class rights, a 
worker resisting arbitration must prove that the FAA’s mandates were 
overridden by a “contrary congressional command” in the FLSA.196  No such 
command is found in the FLSA.197  The FAA’s ability to override the FLSA 
places poor workers in an even more precarious place than the one they occupy; 
in order to recover relatively small sums of money, hourly workers must 
arbitrate individually under rules prescribed by their employers, and such 
                                                 
A-11 (July 24, 2014) (reporting Apple Inc. employees’ claim that they were not paid for meal and 
rest breaks as required by law). 
 189. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2310, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (finding that the Court has made it so that arbitration policies can now “insulate 
wrongdoers from liability”). 
 190. See, e.g., Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1335 (11th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2886 (2014) (holding that the Court’s interpretation of statutes 
similar to the FLSA requires judges to enforce bans on class actions for FLSA claims). 
 191. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).  See also Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-
Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. 
U. L. REV. 523, 532 (2012) (noting that the FLSA “authoriz[es] collective actions”). 
 192. See Walthour, 745 F.3d at 1328. 
 193. In California, for example, minimum wage and overtime violations claims ranged from 
$5,000$7,000.  See Gentry v. Sup. Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 564 (Cal. 2007).  The average award made 
by the state’s Department of Labor Standards Enforcement was $6,038, and cases settled for much 
less, ranging from $400$1,600.  Id. 
 194. See, e.g., Walthour, 745 F.3d at 1332, 1334–35 (noting that “[i]n every case the Supreme 
Court has considered involving a statutory right that does not explicitly preclude arbitration, it has 
upheld the application of the [FAA],” and holding that the FAA trumps the FLSA in terms of 
waiving the right to participate in a class action in an arbitration agreement). 
 195. See id. at 1335 (holding that Congress did not provide for class actions in the FLSA as an 
essential element of vindicating FLSA rights). 
 196. See id. at 1334. 
 197. Id. 
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workers face prohibitive arbitration costs and the prospect of retaliation.198  
Arbitration costs coupled with relatively small recoveries will likely deter most 
FLSA claims, nullifying the FLSA mandate of minimum wage and overtime 
payments.199  Nonetheless, the Court has silently affirmed the conclusion of 
lower courts that workers can effectively vindicate their FLSA rights via 
individual arbitration.200 
Another federal statute that has met the wrath of the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence is the Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA).201  This statute 
was enacted to protect individuals with credit problems, typically poor and 
uninformed consumers.202  The law prohibits deceptive practices by credit repair 
businesses plying their services to consumers.203  To prevent abuse, the CROA 
requires that credit repair businesses disclose to consumers that they have the 
right to sue the organization for violations of the CROA prior to contracting for 
credit repair services.204  The CROA also provides that consumers may bring 
individual or class actions in court for damages.205  The statute further provides 
that waiving any protection or right granted to consumers is void.206 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled that consumers can be required to 
arbitrate their CROA claims in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood.207  The Court 
interpreted the statutory provision of a right to sue as limited to a “right to 
enforce liability” under the CROA rather than a right to go to court.208  The Court 
rejected contextual arguments grounded in other sections of the CROA that 
referred to “action,” “class action,” and “court” as insufficient evidence of 
congressional intent to provide exclusively for a court forum.209  The Court ruled 
that the congressional grant of a “right to sue” is simply a colloquial way of 
                                                 
 198. See Gentry v. Sup. Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 56467 (Cal. 2007) (discussing the significant costs 
of such court actions).  See also Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 110910 (Cal. 
2005) (discussing similar obstacles to individual recovery in the consumer transactions context). 
 199. See Gentry, 165 P.3d at 564. 
 200. The Court denied certiorari in Walthour, allowing the decision to stand.  See 745 F.3d 
1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2886 (2014). 
 201. Consumer Credit Protection Act § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2012). 
 202. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 676 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  See also Arbitration and Consumer Protection—Credit Repair Organizations Act—
Ninth Circuit Holds that Statutory Ban on Arbitration Is Nonwaivable.—Greenwood v. 
Compucredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010)., 124 HARV. L. REV. 1058 (2011) (discussing 
the congressional purpose behind CROA). 
 203. 15 U.S.C. § 1679(a). 
 204. See id. § 1679c(a). 
 205. Id.  See also id. § 1679g. 
 206. See id. § 1679f(a) (“Any waiver by any consumer of any protection provided by or any 
right of the consumer under this [subchapter]—(1) shall be treated as void; and (2) may not be 
enforced by any Federal or State court or any other person.”). 
 207. 132 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2012). 
 208. See id. at 66970 (emphasis added). 
 209. Id. at 670 (concluding that “[t]hese references cannot do the heavy lifting that respondents 
assign them”). 
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saying that a consumer has the legal right to seek damages in court.210  It is not 
a congressional guarantee but rather a congressional “contemplation” of court 
resolution.211  Further, according to the Court, when Congress wants to 
guarantee a court forum, it does so in “less obtuse” ways.212  Faced with an 
express congressional ban on waiver of CROA rights, the Court decided to 
reframe the issue as one of whether the CROA is “silent” on arbitration.213  
Because going to court is not a CROA “right” and Congress did not use the 
magic words that arbitration is prohibited for CROA claims, businesses can bar 
class actions in their form contracts.214 
The Court’s CROA opinion gave no hint as to what is at stake in the case.  
The fact is that plaintiffs complained that CompuCredit targeted consumers with 
weak credit ratings promising to help rebuild their credit with CompuCredit’s 
“Aspire Visa” card.215  Consumers were promised a $300 credit line with no 
required deposits.216  Instead, consumers alleged that CompuCredit did not give 
them the disclosures required by statute (e.g., notice of the right to sue for 
deceptive practices), and “charged an initial finance fee of $29, a monthly fee of 
$6.50, and an annual fee of $150 assessed immediately against the $300 
limit.”217  Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent that “[i]n the aggregate, plaintiffs 
calculated, fees charged the first year amounted to $257.”218 
In addition to barring class actions, the arbitration agreement required 
arbitration through the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), an organization that 
was sued by the Minnesota Attorney General for violating consumer protection 
laws.219  The Attorney General claimed that NAF advertised itself to consumers 
as a neutral independent organization while it simultaneously tried to convince 
credit card companies to implement arbitration policies and name NAF as the 
                                                 
 210. Id. at 672. 
 211. See id. at 671. 
 212. Id. at 672.  The Court’s conclusion is grounded in express congressional prohibition of 
arbitration in a few statutes that postdate the CROA.  See id.  But as the dissent pointed out, the 
statutes the Court relies on were enacted long after the CROA, when Congress recognized that the 
Court had greatly expanded the reach and powers of the FAA.  See id. at 679 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 213. See id. at 66970. 
 214. See id. at 67273 (holding that “[b]ecause the CROA is silent on whether claims under 
the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum, the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to be 
enforced according to its terms”). 
 215. See id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Press Release, Lori Swanson, Attorney General of Minnesota, National Arbitration Forum 
Barred from Credit Card and Consumer Arbitrations Under Agreement with Attorney General 
Swanson (July 19, 2009), http://voiceofsandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/arbitration2-
052313-5.pdf. 
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arbitrator.220  This lawsuit resulted in a consent decree in which NAF was barred 
from handling consumer debt cases for two years.221 
The Court’s CROA decision impelled Justice Ginsburg to write that the 
Court’s interpretation enables the same deception that the CROA sought to 
suppress.222  Laypersons of limited economic means who are uninformed in 
credit matters are required to understand that when Congress says that 
consumers have a right to sue, Congress means that such consumers can go to 
court only if arbitration is not made a condition precedent.223  Justice Ginsburg 
doubted that a statute that expressly provides consumers with a right to sue, 
while also detailing what “courts” must consider in order to award punitive 
damages, and voiding any consumer waiver of any statutory right or protection, 
could authorize credit repair firms to effectively deceive consumers by telling 
them they have a right to sue that is actually only a right to arbitrate.224 
Permitting such obstacles as bans on class arbitration has been rationalized as 
promoting the arbitration attribute of informality, which helps to reduce 
adjudication costs and speeds up the process.225  But the Court equates 
informality with bilateralism by concluding that bilateral arbitration makes the 
arbitration forum informal and thereby efficient.226  The reality is, however, that 
the parties make the forum informal and efficient by relaxing the rules of 
adjudication to achieve speedy and economical resolution.227  The parties 
modify discovery, statute of limitations, evidentiary, and appellate rules, among 
others, to gain speed and economy.228  If one party is allowed to include hurdles 
to adjudication, then informality and efficiency are reduced.229 
The Court also ignores the fact that class arbitration was not a process 
contemplated by the FAA because this form of adjudication did not occur in 
1925.230  In furthering the FAA goal of efficiency via informality, the Court has 
                                                 
 220. See id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 676 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 223. Id. at 678. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011). 
 226. Id. at 1748 (“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”). 
 227. See, e.g., id. at 1749 (discussing that a greater emphasis is placed on efficiency such as 
bringing in specialists). 
 228. See Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 277 (1982) (showing 
the ways in which the dispute process is modified through arbitration).  See also Volt Info. Scis., 
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (noting the FAA’s 
primary goal of enforcing the arbitration terms the parties agreed to). 
 229. See infra notes 23947 and accompanying text. 
 230. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 758 (4th ed. 2005) (observing that 
class actions only became popular after the Federal Rules of Evidence were revised in 1966); 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two 
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focused exclusively on individual claimants, rather than the claims 
themselves.231  For example, 10,000 bilateral arbitrations of the identical claim 
is viewed as more efficient than one class arbitration of the same claim.232  In 
effect, the Court is construing the FAA as endorsing redundant claims, thereby 
making the arbitral forum less efficient than courts where class actions are 
permitted.233  As such, efficiency is evaluated from the perspective of the 
powerful creator of the arbitration agreement, thereby converting the FAA into 
an efficient defense device, rather than an efficient dispute resolution 
mechanism.234  Moreover, after lauding the competence of arbitrators to handle 
complex matters,235 the Court has concluded that class arbitration is too 
sophisticated for them.236 
                                                 
Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1771 (2013) (noting that “[i]n 1966, the 
Supreme Court, acting under authority of a congressional delegation of power, revised Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provided for class actions.”).  See also Am. Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (“The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration 
to the two contracting parties.  It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory 
remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938 . . . .”). 
 231. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2308 (noting that an economist estimated the cost of 
arbitration would far exceed the recovery for the claim); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740, 1760 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “small-dollar” claims will not be 
pursued). 
 232. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 174445, 1749.  In this case, AT&T told customers they 
would get a free phone if they purchased AT&T’s service, but nonetheless charged them $30.22 in 
sales tax for each phone.  Id. at 174445.  Based on the Court’s view of informality, it is more 
speedy and cost effective to arbitrate each claim individually, no matter how many customers are 
making the identical claim of fraud and false advertising.  Id. at 1749.  See also Raviv, supra note 
10, at 221.  Raviv remarks: 
[A]lthough the Court’s recent class arbitration decisions have nominally “favored” 
arbitration by upholding particular arbitration provisions, in fact the rulings may 
ultimately undermine the use of arbitration as an efficient, flexible means of resolving 
disputes [in part by] . . . . unders[elling] the efficiency benefits of class arbitration, 
thereby promoting inefficient piecemeal proceedings . . . . 
Id. 
 233. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 176061 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court is 
discouraging small claims which in many cases will be of such a low value that parties will not 
want to pursue the claim).  See also supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 234. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (holding that the FAA’s purpose is to compel arbitration 
when it is part of the agreement despite what one party might want).  See also id. at 1759 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the intent of Congress in passing the FAA, and Congress’s expectation 
that parties to arbitration agreements would “possess[] roughly equivalent bargaining power”). 
 235. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
63334 (1985) (discussing “access to expertise” provided by arbitration and stating that “the factor 
of potential complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral tribunal could not properly 
handle an antitrust matter”).  See also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 26869 (2009); 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987), rev’d, 896 F.2d 17 (2nd Cir. 
1990). 
 236. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (finding that “while it is theoretically possible to select 
an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators are not 
generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the 
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C.  Fair Vindication Under the FAA 
The Court’s conclusions regarding effective vindication of rights under the 
FAA are also alarming.237  Long before the Court construed the FAA as having 
near-universal application, it ruled that the contractual switch to arbitration was 
dependent on a complaining party retaining the right to vindicate their rights in 
that forum.238  And for the limited rights the Court initially found arbitrable, it 
concluded that a party loses no statutory protection when it gives up the court 
forum.239  As the Court expanded the reach of the FAA to other federal statutes 
in subsequent years, it reaffirmed the “effective vindication” principle that 
switching to an arbitral forum could not prevent a party from vindicating 
statutory remedies.240 
The problem is that this assertion is factually incorrect, and it is not what the 
Court means.  Responding to the Court’s open embrace of arbitration, businesses 
and employers have designed arbitration processes that allocate heavy costs to 
employees and consumers that greatly exceed any potential claim or recovery 
they may have.241  Furthermore, businesses and employers have allocated 
arbitration costs to consumers and employees that are not incurred in court 
cases.242  The Court has approved these adjustments to a contracting party’s 
statutory rights as attributes of arbitration, even though they make the forum 
inaccessible.243  By labeling the non-remedial aspects of statutory protection as 
modifiable procedural rights that can be tailored for efficiency, the Court has 
concluded that no legal right is lost when weak parties face arbitration rules and 
                                                 
protection of absent parties.”).  See also Raviv, supra note 10, at 237 (discussing the Court’s 
paradoxical views on the expertise of arbitrators and noting that “[t]he Court’s reliance on 
arbitrators’ alleged unfamiliarity with class proceedings is puzzling because in other contexts, the 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged that arbitrators’ lack of expertise in an issue is not a legitimate 
obstacle to the arbitrability of those issues”). 
 237. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 231011 (endorsing 
arbitration agreements that make it impractical for weak parties to pursue their claims). 
 238. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637. 
 239. See id. (holding that arbitration of federal claims are only enforceable “so long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action”). 
 240. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (demonstrating that 
there are many cases in which a statutory remedy is provided). 
 241. See, e.g., Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2308 (noting that the respondents, with the use of an 
economist, had argued—and the Court of Appeals found—that arbitration would result in 
exorbitant costs to consumers). 
 242. See Hall v. Treasure Bay V.I. Corp., 371 F. App’x 311, 31213 (3d Cir. 2010) (requiring 
an eight dollar per hour employee to pay the entire costs of arbitration if she loses); Ting v. AT&T, 
319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that arbitration costs greater than the costs of court 
proceedings are unconscionable if allocated to consumers). 
 243. The parties relinquish the court forum in exchange for the speed, lower costs, and 
informality of arbitration.  See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) 
(“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of 
particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than 
disputes concerning commercial contracts.”). 
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costs that deter or preclude their claims.244  This is troubling because arbitration 
was endorsed in the FAA as an alternative forum for vindicating rights rather 
than a mechanism for limiting claims.245 
Encouraged by the Court’s FAA precedents, businesses and employers are 
constantly testing the waters to see how far they can go in adjusting the other 
party’s “procedural rights.”246  Such provisions include dramatic reductions in 
the time allowed to file a claim, as well as severe restrictions on discovery, the 
elimination of class claims, the requirement of distant venues, and the allocation 
of arbitration fees and costs so as to deter claims.247  All of these drafting 
strategies have been approved by the Court as consonant with the FAA 
subsidiary goals of providing an informal, speedy, and cheaper forum.248  The 
Court ruled that employees and consumers are bound by such restrictions on 
their legal rights unless they prove that one or more restrictions prevent 
vindication of their claims.249 
It turns out, however, that even the “effective vindication” principle is not 
what it seems.  In a recent FAA case, the Court ruled that even if one party 
proves that the arbitration agreement makes it economically impracticable to 
prove a statutory remedy, the agreement is still valid and enforceable.250  The 
Court declared that the effective vindication principle originated in dictum, and 
the proper inquiry is whether the arbitration agreement eliminates the right to 
pursue a statutory remedy.251  This constricting of the effective vindication 
                                                 
 244. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 3032.  See also Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 245. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Court’s 
holding distorts the purpose of the FAA to turn the Act into a claim-blocking instrument). 
 246. See supra notes 24145 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which businesses 
and employers take advantage of the opposing party). 
 247. See, e.g., Dortch v. Quality Rest. Concepts, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-00198, 2013 WL 
1789603, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 26, 2013) (noting that the employer’s twenty-day statute of 
limitations was unreasonable); Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So.2d 531, 533 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding unconscionable an arbitration agreement between a nursing home and 
a resident’s daughter that, among other things, prevented the daughter from obtaining the discovery 
required to vindicate her claim); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 1753 
(2011) (upholding a prohibition on class actions in an arbitration agreement); Owner-Operator 
Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. C.R. England, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 126364 (D. Utah 2004) (finding 
unconscionable an arbitration agreement that would have required claimants to arbitrate in a 
“distant and inconvenient forum”); Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461, 463 
(9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-1458, 2015 WL 3646800 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2015) (finding 
unconscionable a fee-shifting provision in an arbitration agreement that provided that prevailing 
plaintiffs would still be required to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs). 
 248. See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749. 
 249. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 250. Id. at 231112.  See also Bruce Wardhaugh, Unveiling Fairness for the Consumer: The 
Law, Economics and Justice of Expanded Arbitration, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 426, 452 (2014) 
(discussing concerns related to arbitral fairness in the wake of American Express). 
 251. See id. at 2310. 
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principle further advances the interests of the powerful contracting parties, as 
the facts of the case in which it originated demonstrates. 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,252 merchants alleged 
that American Express violated the federal antitrust laws by forcing them to pay 
much higher fees on American Express cards than what was charged by 
competitors.253  The agreement between the parties contained an arbitration 
clause that prohibited class actions or the joinder of claims or parties.254  It also 
prohibited collaboration between merchants to prove antitrust violations, in 
addition to any cost-shifting, should a merchant prevail in arbitration.255 
In American Express, the Court established that a merchant cannot win its 
antitrust case in arbitration unless it produces “an economic analysis defining 
the relevant markets, establishing Amex’s monopoly power, showing 
anticompetitive effects, and measuring damages.”256  Such an analysis would 
cost at least several hundred thousand dollars and as much as one million 
dollars.257  If the Italian Colors Restaurant prevailed, it would recover $12,850, 
or $38,549 as treble damages, under the antitrust laws.258 
In upholding the arbitration agreement, the Court ruled that the antitrust laws 
do not prohibit class arbitration bans or “guarantee an affordable procedural path 
to the vindication of every claim.”259  The purpose of the effective vindication 
“exception” is to prevent the elimination of the right to pursue statutory 
remedies.260  This arbitration agreement does not do this, even if it makes 
vindication “not worth the expense.”261  The Court concluded that the FAA does 
not approve of a cost-benefit analysis of claims by courts prior to approving 
arbitration contracts because such a process interferes with the benefits of 
arbitration: informality, speed, and lower costs.262  This analysis failed to reckon 
with the reality that in a court action, the class claims would be permissible, 
thereby promoting vindication itself as well as a fair opportunity at vindication. 
The Court’s American Express decision is detrimental to consumers, 
employees, and any weak party subject to the FAA because the effective 
vindication principle provided one of the few devices available to challenge 
                                                 
 252. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 253. Id. at 2308. 
 254. Id. (discussing the prohibition on class actions).  See also id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the prohibition on joining claims and parties). 
 255. Id. at 231617 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 256. Id. at 2316. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 2308 (majority opinion). 
 259. Id. at 2309. 
 260. Id. at 2310. 
 261. Id. at 231011. 
 262. See id. at 2312. 
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class action bans and oppressive cost-sharing and cost-shifting practices.263  
Federal protection for employees and consumers generally lacks arbitration 
prohibitions or class bans, primarily because legislators were unaware that the 
FAA approved such practices.264  That the FAA can be used as a shield for 
arbitration agreements that immunize one party from federal and state laws, or 
force a party to forego his claim, places large sections of society at risk of losing 
rights that previously existed.  According to Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, the Court’s ruling creates “a mechanism easily made to block the 
vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from 
liability.”265  The effective vindication principle permitted courts to 
accommodate the policy of the FAA—to promote arbitration—with the policies 
of other federal statutes.266  Now consumers and workers must either forego their 
claims or make economically disastrous decisions in order to enforce their legal 
rights.  This will continue to be the national rule for arbitral adjudication unless 
the Court’s FAA precedents are overruled or circumvented. 
III.  CRAFTING A SUSTAINABLE ARBITRATION POLICY 
Arbitration today is a far cry from what the FAA Congress knew it to be.  In 
1925, arbitration was sought by merchants and other commercial parties who 
made arms-length and truly consensual contracts.267  Today, arbitration is 
generally referred to as “mandatory” because the voluntary aspects are missing 
in most cases.268  Outside of traditional commercial and labor cases, arbitration 
is often an effectively involuntary process.269  Weak parties generally gain no 
                                                 
 263. For example, the Court ruled in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph that an 
arbitration contract could be invalidated with proof that arbitration costs were prohibitive.  531 U.S. 
79, 9192 (2000).  This cost-allocation element of arbitration contracts greatly influences courts 
when they are evaluating whether arbitration agreements are unconscionable.  See, e.g., Abramson 
v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 44142 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding as unconscionable 
an arbitration agreement that required the employee to pay half of the forum costs). 
 264. See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 679 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (observing that it was many years after 1996 that Congress was alerted to the need to 
insert carefully crafted prohibitions of arbitration in federal statutes). 
 265. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 266. See id.  Justice Kagan stated, “[o]ur effective-vindication rule comes into play only when 
the FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law, like the Sherman Act here.  In that all-
federal context, one law does not automatically bow to the other, and the effective-vindication rule 
serves as a way to reconcile any tension between them.”  Id. 
 267. See Sternlight, supra note 40, at 1635 (noting that businesses typically sought arbitration 
to ensure neutral decisionmaking).  See also supra notes 7678 and accompanying text. 
 268. Sternlight, supra note 40, 163233 (discussing the involuntary nature of arbitration today 
for consumers and employees irrespective of whether the process is labeled “mandatory,” 
“compelled,” “promulgated,” or “contractual”).  See also id. at 1632 n.1 (discussing the debate over 
the propriety of some contemporary arbitration arrangements). 
 269. Id. at 1636.  In 1925, one prescient Senator suggested that arbitration agreements might 
be “offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees.”  Id. (quoting Prima 
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benefit from the arbitral forum, so the stronger party must impose it upon 
them.270  The fact that the weak party has no bargaining input or choice is 
generally not a problem by itself, as contract law accommodates non-bargained 
transactions or adhesion agreements.271  The problem today is that the more 
powerful party uses its contracting power to erect barriers to legitimate claims 
in the arbitration agreement.  Because these barriers have been approved as 
attributes of arbitration, the arbitral forum has become an efficient vehicle to 
deny claims. 
The attributes of arbitration have not changed over time.  Speed, reduced 
costs, informality, fairness, and expert neutrals have always made arbitration 
attractive, but these benefits are no longer available to the majority of individuals 
governed by arbitration contracts.272  Class action bans have been approved by 
the Court even though class arbitration promotes the efficiency that is the 
touchstone of arbitration.273  Businesses insist on bilateral or piecemeal 
resolution of disputes in arbitration even when it produces redundancy and 
drives up costs.274  While the Court has expressed concern about the economic 
and procedural burdens that class claims may impose on businesses, it has 
ignored the economic effects class bans have had on poor workers and 
consumers.275 
The FAA precedents have made a mockery of the FAA goal of legitimizing a 
private alternative to court adjudication, and ignore recent developments that 
have changed the practice of arbitration.  The Court has not been responsive to 
the implications of forced consent, and the wrapping of statutory rights and class 
                                                 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)).  See 
also Patel, supra note 139. 
 270. Sternlight, supra note 40, at 1649 (noting that “critics often point out that many (although 
admittedly not all) consumer and employment arbitration agreements . . . try to slant the odds in 
companies’ favor from a substantive standpoint”).  Even if consumers and employees are free to 
shop or work elsewhere and not sign offensive arbitration agreements, it is becoming increasingly 
impractical to avoid such policies.  Id. at 1632 n.1. 
 271. Id. at 1653 (discussing how contract law assumes consent and does not require subjective 
understanding, which accommodates the concept of adhesion contracts). 
 272. Id. at 1654 (noting that arbitration is not necessarily an easier, more fair alternative for 
individuals anymore). 
 273. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217, 221 (1985) (holding that one 
goal of the FAA is efficient and speedy resolution of disputes).  Class actions were created to permit 
suits by “large numbers of individuals or organizations whose interests are sufficiently related so 
that it is more efficient to adjudicate their rights or liabilities in a single action than in a series of 
individual proceedings.”  See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 230, at 75758. 
 274. Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 217, 221 (observing that federal law requires piecemeal 
adjudication through arbitrations imposed by businesses, despite potential inefficiency and 
redundancy). 
 275. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (finding that class 
arbitration takes more time, adds formality to the arbitration process, and increases corporate 
liability risks).  However, class actions “may represent the only viable method for people with small 
claims to vindicate their rights or for important social issues to be litigated.”  See FRIEDENTHAL ET 
AL., supra note 230, at 758. 
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action bans in arbitration agreements.  As a result, businesses now choose to 
spend tens of thousands of dollars to arbitrate a case even when less-expensive 
court resolution is quicker.276  Whataburger Restaurants LLC v. Cardwell277 
offers a classic illustration of why it is better to have an expensive and protracted 
bilateral arbitration.278 
In Whataburger, an employee sued her employer for workplace injuries, and 
her employer moved to compel arbitration consistent with its workplace 
policy.279  From the American Arbitration Association’s website, the trial judge 
determined that a three-day arbitration would cost about $12,000 in fees, and 
about $20,000 for the arbitrator.280  The judge also responded to the employer’s 
claim that arbitration was speedier because the case could be resolved in one 
year, by offering to try the case in six months.281  When the employer rejected 
the judge’s offer of a low-cost, quick trial, the judge concluded that the 
employer’s claim in its arbitration policy that arbitration was quicker and 
cheaper was incorrect.282 
In denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, the trial judge noted: 
Whataburger wants to pay approximately $20,000 for an arbitrator to 
consider the claims at a later hearing for no conceivable reason . . . 
other than Whataburger’s belief that it will fare much better, and Ms. 
Cardwell will fare much worse, before an arbitrator . . . .  In this case 
Whataburger could proceed to trial more quickly with no costs, but, 
instead is asking to pay approximately $20,000 for a slower process 
so that it can buy an AAA fact finder.283 
Other aspects of the employer’s arbitration agreement also drove up costs.  
The agreement provided that arbitration would take place in Dallas, Texas, even 
though the employee worked in El Paso.284  The judge observed that the 
employee made $7.40 per hour and would never be able to afford the costs to 
travel to Dallas and bring her witnesses along.285  In response, the employer 
argued that the judge could sever this oppressive venue provision and the 
employer would consent to arbitration in El Paso.286  The judge rejected this 
approach and ruled: 
                                                 
 276. See Sternlight, supra note 40, at 1652 (discussing the ways in which courts have 
rationalized class action bans).  See also infra notes 27790. 
 277. No. 08-13-00280-cv, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8895 (Tex. App., Aug. 13, 2014), opinion 
withdrawn by, substituted opinion at, and remanded by 446 S.W. 3d 897 (Tex. App. Aug. 13, 2014). 
 278. Id. at *35.  See also infra notes 27990. 
 279. Whataburger, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *12. 
 280. Id. at *19, 21. 
 281. Id. at *7. 
 282. Id. at *23. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See id. at *2, n.2. 
 285. Id. at *22. 
 286. Id. at *1112. 
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If Whataburger were ever to use the Dallas requirement to preclude an 
employee from pursuing a claim, that would be unconscionable.  If 
Whataburger would always waive it and allow employees to have a 
hearing in their home community, then the Court can think of no 
reason to have it in the policy other than to discourage employees, and 
plaintiff’s lawyers, from bringing claims in the first place.287 
In the end, however, the employee was forced to arbitrate because an appellate 
court ruled that the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of the AAA’s fees, 
and decided a matter not before the court.288  Nonetheless, judges are noting that 
arbitration has become “a system that lets large corporations lavishly buy their 
way out of judicial accountability and into a system more favorable to their 
side.”289  Another judge in an earlier case had noted that because of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, the FAA now “permit[s] a few major corporations to draft 
contracts regarding their relationship with others that immunizes them from 
accountability under the laws of the states where they do business, and by the 
courts in those states.”290 
Ironically, if the Court pursued the true purposes of arbitration and the FAA, 
weak parties such as consumers and workers would be the beneficiaries.  
Collective claims in arbitration can greatly reduce adjudication costs for both 
parties and make vindication feasible for millions of workers claiming wage and 
hour violations.291  Class actions are also instrumental in making consumer fraud 
cases viable, because the costs to prosecute individual claims often make it 
impracticable for plaintiffs to prosecute such cases on an individual basis.292  
Informal resolution by neutrals familiar with an industry would make the 
vindication of rights by workers and consumers speedier and cheaper, while 
significantly reducing judicial workload.  These realities militate in favor of 
codifying practices that make the arbitration forum an attractive alternative to 
courts.  Achieving this is the more difficult task. 
A.  Judicial Defiance 
One approach used to infuse fairness into arbitration practices has been to 
ignore the Court’s jurisprudence that allows a small group of powerful parties to 
impose lopsided arbitration agreements on others.293  A few lower court judges 
                                                 
 287. Id. at *23. 
 288. See id. at *2425. 
 289. Id. at *19. 
 290. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 941 (Mont. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Doctor’s Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1995) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring). 
 291. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (noting that class actions 
were designed to overcome the problems individual small claimants face in pursuing their legal 
rights). 
 292. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 230. 
 293. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus. Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 782, 785 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that California courts may invalidate an arbitration clause under the doctrine of 
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have ignored or reinterpreted Court precedents to restrict their impact.294  In one 
West Virginia Supreme Court case, Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare 
Corp.,295 the court rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of the FAA 
and refused to apply them.296  The court stated that the Supreme Court had 
imposed its own biased viewpoint on the FAA, and created doctrine for the FAA 
“from whole cloth.”297  The court then upheld on public policy grounds, a state 
law that made predispute arbitration agreements covering personal injury or 
wrongful death claims against nursing homes unenforceable.298  The court 
concluded that Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to such claims.299 
Other judges have shown their discontent more indirectly.  In Casarotto v. 
Lombardi,300 the Montana Supreme Court refused to apply the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s FAA preemption rules.301  That court upheld a state law that made 
arbitration agreements unenforceable unless conspicuous notice of arbitration 
was typed on the first page of the contract.302  While Supreme Court precedents 
treat such state laws as preempted for targeting arbitration, the Montana judges 
decided that the state statute did not undermine FAA policies or goals by making 
                                                 
unconscionability).  See also Paul T. Milligan, Who Decides the Arbitrability of Construction 
Disputes?, 31 CONSTRUCTION LAW., at 23 n.4 (2011) (noting that the Alabama chief justice in 
Selma Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Fontenot, 824 So.2d 668 (Ala. 2001), stated that “the Supreme Court had 
‘unconstitutionally expanded the boundaries of the Federal Arbitration Act’ and ‘defiantly 
concluded that the FAA still did not apply in state courts notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 
views’”) (quoting Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the 
Evolution of the Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1433 (2008)). 
 294. See infra notes 295311 and accompanying text. 
 295. 724 S.E.2d 250, 263 (W. Va. 2011), vacated by Marmet Health Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 
S. Ct. 1201 (2012). 
 296. See id. at 263 (“[A]fter considering the history and purposes of the FAA, we determine 
that Congress did not intend for the FAA to apply to arbitration clauses in pre-injury contracts, 
where a personal injury or wrongful death occurred after the signing of the contract.”). 
 297. Id. at 279. 
 298. Id. at 292. 
 299. Id.  Although the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia acknowledged that the state 
law was preempted to the extent that it nullified any arbitration provision in a nursing home 
contract, it concluded that Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to predispute arbitration 
agreements covering personal injury and wrongful death cases arising under nursing home 
contracts.  Id. 
 300. 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 
681 (1995). 
 301. Id. at 93839.  In doing so, the court argued that its decision should not offend Supreme 
Court precedent: 
Presumably, therefore, the Supreme Court would not find it a threat to the policies of the 
Federal Arbitration Act for a state to require that before arbitration agreements are 
enforceable, they be entered knowingly.  To hold otherwise would be to infer that 
arbitration is so onerous as a means of dispute resolution that it can only be foisted upon 
the uninformed.  That would be inconsistent with the conclusion that the parties to the 
contract are free to decide how their disputes should be resolved. 
Id. at 939. 
 302. Id. 
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sure that arbitration agreements were made knowingly.303  When the Court 
remanded this decision for reconsideration in light of an intervening 
precedent,304 the Montana judges distinguished that case and stuck to their 
guns.305  This defiance led to a second grant of certiorari and reversal.306  Such 
recalcitrance is not constitutionally sound,307 and it cannot operate as a long-
term solution.  The Court can readily grant certiorari in cases of resistance and 
overrule them, thereby forcing compliance. 
Businesses know that the Court is keen on arbitration, so they are incentivized 
to challenge lower court rulings that do not go their way.  Furthermore, the Court 
is accommodating these challenges by regularly granting certiorari to petitions 
alleging that judges have strayed from the Court’s precedents.  Fowler v. 
CarMax, Inc.308 provides another example.309  In this case, CarMax complained 
that the California courts were not following Court precedents that held that 
courts cannot weigh the effects of a class action ban on workers’ employment 
law claims prior to enforcing the prohibition.310  The Court granted CarMax’s 
petition for certiorari, vacated the California court of appeal decision, and 
                                                 
 303. See id. at 93839.  The Supreme Court of Montana focused on the principles guiding the 
Court’s precedent in Volt Information Sciences, Inc., namely that the FAA did not preempt the 
entire field of arbitration, that contract interpretation is generally a state law issue, and that 
arbitration agreements should be entered into knowingly.  Id.  Because the Montana law targeted 
arbitration to promote one of its virtues, the court decided it was not preempted.  Id. 
 304. After the Montana Supreme Court decided Casarotto v. Lombardi, the Supreme Court 
decided Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).  This case dealt with an 
Alabama statute that made predispute agreements unenforceable, and a lower court ruling that the 
FAA did not apply to the parties’ termite contract because the transaction was essentially a local 
one and not interstate.  Id. at 26870. 
 305. See Casarotto, 901 P.2d at 599.  Besides demonstrating how unrelated the issues were in 
their case and the Court’s intervening ruling in Dobson, the judges took a jab at the Court by noting 
that the Dobson decision simply extolled the virtues of arbitration based on guidance from the 
American Arbitration Association.  Id. 
 306. See Doctor’s Assocs, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996). 
 307. The Supremacy Clause requires all judges to follow the rules laid down by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.  The clause states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. 
 308. No. B238426, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2159 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2013), vacated 
by 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014). 
 309. Id. at *25 (reversing a trial court order compelling arbitration and allowing a class action 
to proceed).  See also infra note 311 and accompanying text (documenting the Court’s reversal of 
the California Court of Appeals’s decision). 
 310. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13, CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC v. Fowler, 
134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014) (No. 13-439), 2013 WL 5553442, at *13. 
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remanded it for reconsideration, in light of its recent precedents.311  These grants 
of certiorari demonstrate that businesses and the Court are vigilantly guarding 
the FAA precedents, making them difficult to circumvent by judicial fiat. 
B.  Court Override 
Another possibility for relief can be found in the Justices’ disagreement about 
the FAA’s applicability to the states.312  This could be achieved were the Court 
to overrule its decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating,313 which held that the 
FAA applies in both federal and state courts.314  This single override can open 
space for states to regulate arbitration agreements that include obstacles to 
vindicating legal rights.  There is some judicial support for such an override as 
evidenced by Justice Scalia’s declaration that he stands ready to join other 
Justices to do just that.315  Justice Thomas has also expressed that the FAA does 
not apply to state courts,316 adding that businesses’ reliance on arbitration 
policies is not an “unacceptably high” price to pay for correcting Southland.317 
Other Justices frustrated with the Court’s FAA precedents can join these 
Justices to overrule Southland.  But while the Court override may be efficient, 
there are reasons to doubt that the Court itself will scale back its arbitration rules.  
The fact is that stare decisis provides an effective mask for refusing to overrule 
even wrongly decided cases.318  Justice O’Connor cited this principle for her 
                                                 
 311. See CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC v. Fowler, No. 13-439, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 1611 
(Feb. 24, 2014) (granting review to and vacating and remanding the appellate court decision).  The 
California Supreme Court got the message, as in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 
the state’s highest court reversed state policy by ruling that class action bans are enforceable.  327 
P.3d 129, 142 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015).  Lower courts are also falling in 
line.  See, e.g., Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc., 234 Cal. App. 4th 947, 96566 (Feb. 25, 2015), 
modified, (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2015) (en banc), amended, (Wash. Dec. 10, 2013), 
reconsideration denied (Wash. Dec. 12, 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2821 (2014) (holding that a 
class action ban for wage and hour claims in an arbitration agreement is enforceable). 
 312. Some Justices have argued that Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to the states.  
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2122 (1984) (O’Connor and Rehnquist, JJ., 
dissenting) (analyzing Section 2 of the FAA and noting that the provision “does not, on its face, 
identify which judicial forums are bound by its requirements”).  Others have argued for a narrower 
interpretation of the FAA’s reach.  See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) 
(Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing that the “parsimonious construction of § 
1 of the [FAA] is not consistent with [the Court’s] expansive reading of § 2”). 
 313. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 314. Id. at 10, 16. 
 315. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 28485 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 316. See id. at 28384 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 317. See id. at 295. 
 318. This principle that seeks to uphold Court precedents unless special justification is shown, 
has particular force in the area of statutory construction.  See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164, 17273 (1989) (noting that while Court precedent is not “sacrosanct,” overturning 
precedent usually requires extraordinary circumstances).  For a discussion of the effect of stare 
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change of heart about overruling Southland.319  In the case of arbitration 
jurisprudence, stare decisis involves more than businesses’ reliance interests that 
have adopted arbitration policies.320  It also implicates the Court’s selfish but 
necessary drive to reduce judicial workload.321 
The problem of overcrowded dockets and lengthy delays has plagued the 
judiciary for some time,322 and the Justices recognize that the arbitral forum 
provides significant caseload relief.323  Every year, the various arbitration 
agencies handle thousands of cases that may otherwise end up in courts.324  
                                                 
decisis on wrongly decided cases, see generally Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably 
Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 319. Justice O’Connor changed her mind ten years after condemning the Court in the Southland 
case.  See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 28384 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  She blamed her changed 
attitude on stare decisis and the increased reliance on arbitration to settle disputes, essentially 
concluding that forced arbitration works.  Id. (noting that while “Congress never intended the 
[FAA] to apply in state courts, and that [the] Court has strayed far afield,” and “[w]ere we writing 
on a clean slate, I would adhere to that view,” because more than a decade had gone by since 
Southland, other cases have added to the body of law stemming from that case, and “parties have 
undoubtedly made contracts in reliance” on that precedent, “considerations of stare decisis” are 
persuasive). 
 320. In addition to the usual considerations that support upholding precedents, the Court has 
noted that “private parties have likely written contracts relying upon Southland as authority.”  See 
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272.  Other factors that favor upholding Southland were congressional 
inaction on the decision, its practical workability, and the absence of later cases or other changes 
eroding its principles.  See id. 
 321. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (citing litigation burden 
on the courts, among other things, as justification for reading the FAA broadly to cover most 
employment disputes). 
 322. In 1982, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote: 
[F]or at least the past 20 years there has been a slowly, all too slowly, developing 
awareness that the traditional litigation process has become too cumbersome, too 
expensive, and also burdened by many other disadvantages.  In 1976 we took note of 
these problems in commemorating the 70th anniversary of Roscoe Pound’s indictment 
of the American judicial and legal systems. . . .  It is now clear that neither the federal 
nor the state court systems are capable of handling all the burdens placed upon them. 
See Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 277 (Mar. 1982).  Caseloads 
continue to expand even as more cases are shuttled to arbitration.  See Judicial Caseload 
Indicators—Judicial Business 2014, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/statistics-reports/judicial-caseload-indicators-judicial-business-2014 (last visited Sept. 18, 
2015) (reporting that between 2005 and 2014, filings in U.S. district courts increased from 253,273 
to 295,310). 
 323. See Burger, supra note 322 (noting that in one pilot project in Philadelphia, 12,000 of 
about 16,000 civil cases were resolved by arbitration in one year).  See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1, 19 (1983) (stating that “[a] promising development, perhaps accelerating as legal fees 
increase, is the attention now given to out-of-court dispute resolution through counseling, 
mediation, arbitration and other devices”). 
 324. See FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 1, 3 (2014), https:// 
www.fmcs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/FOIA_FY_2014_Annual_Report.pdf (reporting that 
the agency’s arbitrators decided more than 2,100 labor cases in fiscal year 2014).  While private 
arbitration service providers are not publishing or releasing the specific number of arbitrations they 
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Many high court justices have been outspoken about the need to move more 
disputes to the arbitral forum,325 and they see claims that involve small sums as 
particularly well-suited for this.326  Because vulnerable populations such as 
employees and consumers are the typical small claimants, their claims now face 
the harshest assaults from the Court’s FAA jurisprudence.  This practical need 
to reduce judicial workload stands as a major obstacle to getting a majority of 
Justices to agree to overrule one or more of the FAA precedents. 
C.  Congressional Override 
A third strategy that has been employed to reverse the Court’s arbitration 
precedents is the congressional override.327  The Court’s wide-ranging embrace 
of arbitration agreements despite their negative impact on weak parties’ legal 
rights has triggered successive congressional initiatives.328  The latest attempt at 
congressional override is a bill titled the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 
(AFA).329  This senate bill, introduced by sixteen democrats, seeks to undo most 
of what the Court has interpreted the FAA to require.330  Specifically, it seeks to 
make invalid and unenforceable predispute arbitration agreements for 
                                                 
handle yearly, there is evidence that it ranges in the thousands.  See About JAMS, JUDICIAL 
ARBITRATION & MEDIATION SERVS., http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus_overview/ (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2015) (noting that JAMS “handles an average of more than 12,000 cases per year”).  The 
agency does not separate mediations from arbitrations.  Id. 
 325. In 1981, when some Justices were still insisting that statutory rights were independent, 
non-waivable individual rights, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist flatly stated the case for 
the business community and the judiciary, remarking that all three branches of government have 
approved pilot programs to remove small claims from the courts.  See Barrentime v. Ark.-Best 
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 746 (1981) (Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justices Burger 
and Rehnquist stated that the Court’s decision to guarantee the statutory court forum for wage and 
hour claims ignores “the objectives of Congress, the agreement of the parties, and the common 
sense of the situation.  It moves toward making federal courts small claims courts contrary to the 
constitutional concept of these courts as having special and limited jurisdiction.”  Id.  Years later, 
Justice O’Connor also disclosed the influence of business efficiency on her interpretation of the 
FAA.  See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 28384 (1995) (O’Connor J., 
concurring).  She wrote that the reliance interests of businesses require approval of the Court’s 
FAA preemption rules even if those rules stem from erroneous legal interpretations.  Id.  This 
sentiment was repeated by Justice Kennedy in his majority opinion in Circuit City.  532 U.S. at 123 
(stating that the arbitration of employment disputes would promote the reliance interests of 
employers in alternative dispute resolution while relieving the courts of the burdens of such 
litigation).  Id. 
 326. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281 (noting that by not enforcing arbitration agreements, “the 
typical consumer who has only a small damages claim [would be left] without any remedy but a 
court remedy, the costs and delays of which could eat up the value of an eventual small recovery”). 
 327. See Sternlight, supra note 40, at 1643 (noting that “[e]ven in this most pro-arbitrataion 
era . . . Congress has the power to make claims nonarbitrable”). 
 328. See generally Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) 
(providing that agreements to arbitrate certain types of claims are not enforceable); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (providing the same). 
 329. See generally S. 878. 
 330. See generally id. 
2015] Reforming the Federal Arbitration Act 125 
employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights claims, thereby reversing the 
Court’s conclusion that only transportation employees are excluded from FAA 
coverage.331  Further, it seeks to reverse the Court’s conclusion that contracting 
parties can delegate validity and enforceability issues to an arbitrator by 
requiring court determination of such issues.332  In addition, it prohibits unions 
from contracting to arbitrate their members’ statutory or constitutional rights 
under state and federal laws.333 
This partisan proposal for override, like previous attempts, has little chance of 
success, and various iterations of the proposal (including the 2013 House bill) 
have died in committee.334  The FAA precedents benefit the most powerful 
players in American society, such as businesses and the judiciary, so it will be a 
herculean task to get them all reversed.335  Pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
also produce efficiencies that modern businesses and the judiciary need,336 so 
attempts at an override must accommodate these realities. 
D.  A Legislative Proposal 
Because a policy that permits only powerful parties access to courts, and 
accommodates a denial of legal rights is not sustainable, a narrow legislative 
strategy that is palatable to legislators of both political parties is worth 
considering.  A more tailored response could garner bipartisan support for a 
narrow amendment to the FAA. 
                                                 
 331. See id. § 402(a). 
 332. Id. § 402(b)(1). 
 333. Id. § 402(b)(2).  The 2009 proposal exempted labor contracts.  See H.R. 1020 § 4.  
However, the Supreme Court subsequently held in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett that unions can 
bargain away their members’ statutory rights in arbitration agreements.  See 556 U.S. 247, 274 
(2009). 
 334. Bills to reverse the Court’s FAA precedents have failed early in the legislative process.  
See generally H.R. 1020; S. 878.  See also Claudia H. Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of 
Stockholder Disputes?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 751, 775 n.130 (2015) (noting that the Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2013 died in committee); Tanya M. Marcum & Elizabeth A. Campbell, The 
Arbitration Seesaw: Federal Act Preempts General Law Thereby Restricting Judicial Review, 47 
VAL. U. L. REV. 965, 974 n.37 (2013) (noting that the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 died in 
committee). 
 335. See generally Sternlight, supra note 40, at 1649 (arguing that arbitration harms consumers 
since they do not “typically read or understand the [arbitration] clauses” and “limits the amount of 
pretrial discovery available to consumers and also limits their opportunity for appeal”). 
 336. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 28081 (1995) (stating that 
arbitration is cheaper, faster, simpler, and more flexible than litigation); Casarotto v. Lombardi, 
886 P.2d 931, 93940 (Mont. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 
681 (1995) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (noting that while arbitration allows national 
corporations to oppress weak parties, federal judges regard arbitration as a solution to their swollen 
dockets). 
126 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:79 
Instead of attempting a broad ban on predispute agreements to arbitrate, 
legislators should propose a narrow amendment to the FAA.  The FAA can be 
amended to include a definition of “arbitration”337 that states, for example: 
Arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution process agreed to by the 
parties for its benefits of speed, informality, lower costs, or expert 
neutrals, that are not possible in the courts.  Any provision or device 
that detracts from these attributes of arbitration are void.  For 
example, class action bans, forum cost allocation, distant venue, and 
reservation of court forum provisions that interfere with or prolong 
the adjudication of claims are void, while practices that promote 
efficient resolution such as reasonable limits on discovery, statute of 
limitations, and appellate review, among others, are presumptively 
valid. 
This definition will codify the undisputed attributes of arbitration, and give each 
attribute equal importance.  It will also account for new developments and unfair 
practices that the Court has endorsed as attributes of arbitration protected by the 
FAA.  This is necessary because arbitration has to be a process that is cheaper, 
speedier, and less formal than courts.  Efficiency should be gained from having 
expert neutrals and fair rules on costs, speed, and informality.  A court should 
not be able to use any one of these attributes to trump another or all others.  
Courts must apply these attributes together to decide whether an implemented 
policy is an arbitration policy or merely an attempt at insulation from claims. 
This narrow definition addresses these problems.  For example, in Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams,338 the Court suggested that arbitration allows the parties 
to avoid the costs of litigation, and the parties traded the court forum in exchange 
for the speed, lower costs, and informality of arbitration.339  But later in 
American Express, the Court ignored the reality that bilateral arbitration of 
antitrust claims would be more costly and protracted than class adjudication of 
those same claims in court.340  This is a recurring problem in the Court’s FAA 
precedents.341  In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,342 the Court ruled that the 
expeditious results associated with informality is arbitration’s “principal 
advantage,”343  while in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,344 the Court stated 
                                                 
 337. The FAA does not define “arbitration.”  See Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 
111 F.3d 343, 350 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 338. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 339. Id. at 123. 
 340. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). 
 341. Gilles, supra note 35, at 39495. 
 342. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 343. Id. at 1751.  See also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357 (2008) (holding that the primary 
objective of an agreement to arbitrate is a speedy resolution of the dispute). 
 344. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
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that expeditious results is not an overriding goal.345  However, making thousands 
of consumers or workers individually arbitrate the same claim makes the 
arbitration process slower and costlier than a single class action in court for the 
same claim.346  Courts should not be allowed to consider and rely solely on the 
efficiency benefits to the party who drafted the arbitration policy in deciding its 
enforceability. 
Arbitration agreements are consonant with the FAA only when they deliver a 
forum that is expeditious, neutral, and fair.  So a court should be precluded from 
enforcing an arbitration policy that erects obstacles to vindication.  In Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,347 the Court ruled that a forum change to 
arbitration does not affect substantive rights.348  Yet in American Express, the 
effect of the Court’s holding was to suggest that a fair opportunity to vindicate 
legal rights is not a central tenet of the FAA.349  In a court action, consumers and 
workers do not face class bans, high forum cost, and distant venue provisions 
that make it impracticable to pursue their legal rights.350  Arbitration must 
therefore reduce rather than add obstacles to vindication, and any policy that 
adds cost or complexity to pursuing claims should be regarded as antithetical to 
the FAA and therefore unenforceable. 
The proposed definition of arbitration therefore guarantees that arbitration 
will be pursued for its speed, lower cost, informality, and expert neutrals.  It also 
allows the courts to distinguish between laws that target arbitration to promote 
its attributes, and those that outright reject arbitration as unsuitable for certain 
types of claims.  So, for example, a state law that prohibits bans on class 
arbitration when class resolution is more efficient can be upheld as consistent 
with the FAA goal of speedy resolution.  Also, by making all the attributes of 
arbitration equally important, it eliminates the arbitrary prioritization of consent 
over speed, for example, in any particular case.  The definition also consciously 
leaves out the word “voluntary,” in recognition of the fact that in most cases 
today, consent is not voluntarily given.351  Nonetheless, the process is not 
impaired because one party had no meaningful choice in agreeing to an 
arbitration policy. 
                                                 
 345. Id. at 221 (holding that when elements of consent and speed collide, consent must trump 
speed). 
 346. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 347. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 348. Id. at 29. 
 349. Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 231011 (2013).  See also supra 
notes 189200 (discussing how the courts’ application of the FAA has overtaken rights to sue under 
the FLSA). 
 350. See generally Sternlight, supra note 40, at 164142 (discussing the disadvantages of 
arbitration pursuant to certain companies’ arbitration agreements). 
 351. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
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By promulgating a national definition of arbitration, Congress can reinforce 
the FAA’s and states’ endorsement of arbitration, while curtailing current 
abusive practices.  This will protect weak parties from ceding their legal rights 
to partisan policies they must accept or are unable to challenge because of a lack 
of alternatives or limited financial resources.  It will also significantly reduce 
litigation challenging arbitration policies on mutuality, unconscionability, and 
other grounds, thereby further reducing judicial caseload. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Tens of millions of low-wage workers and consumers do not have the basic 
income they need for daily necessities.352  Arbitration, an instrument thought of 
as promoting efficiency and fairness,353 has become a choice mechanism for 
robbing workers and consumers of what little they have.354  This reality was 
made possible by the Supreme Court, and will only continue unless Congress 
does something.355  Congress can limit the Court’s erroneous FAA jurisprudence 
by enacting national standards for arbitration agreements.  Because arbitration 
is now an indispensable part of the adjudication process,356 broad prohibitions 
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements are not necessary or feasible.  However, 
bipartisan support should be available for arbitration rules that anchor the forum 
in speed, fairness, and reduced costs for all parties. 
                                                 
 352. See David Lazarus, Wage Stagnation Puts the Squeeze on Ordinary Workers, L.A.  
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus-20141228-column.html 
(discussing how wages have not kept pace with inflation). 
 353. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 31920 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra notes 319–20 and accompanying text. 
